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OUTSOURCING HUMAN REPRODUCTION: EMBRYOS & SURROGACY 
SERVICES IN THE CYBERPROCREATION ERA 
 
J. BRAD REICH* & DAWN SWINK** 
 
“Cyberprocreation”: using the Internet to create human life 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
     Traditionally, a child was conceived via male-female intercourse, but the Internet 
provides many more possibilities.  In 2011 Patrick, a single, sterile man wants a baby, but 
does not want to adopt.1  He goes online and performs a Google search for eggs2 and 
sperm3 to discover millions of ready suppliers.4  Patrick purchases these materials 
through PayPal.5  He wants his child as soon as possible,6 so he has the tissues shipped to 
                                            
* B.B.A, University of Iowa, J.D. with Honors, Drake University Law School, L.L.M., University of 
Missouri-Columbia School of Law, Assistant Professor of Business Law University of Puget Sound. This 
article is dedicated to Pete Countryman the meanest, and maybe the best man I ever knew. 
 
** J.D. Drake University Law School, Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas.  This article is 
dedicated to my sister, Peg Grundmeier. 
 
1 Patrick is a fictional character used for illustrative purposes.    
 
2 A January 4, 2011, Google search using “egg donor wanted” returned 85,301 hits in .14 seconds 
(examples included: www.thrdonorsource.com, www.tinytreasuresagency.com, www.eggdonation.com, 
www.dreamdonation.com, and www.coriseggdonorservices.com). 
 
3 A January 4, 2011, Google search using “sperm donor wanted” returned 127,101 hits in .18 seconds 
(examples included: www.privatesperm.com, www.sperm-donors-worldwide.com, and 
www.fairfaxcryobank.com, and www.Xytex.com). 
 
4 Although Patrick is intrigued by entities offering “designer” embryos (see infra text acc. note 20) it is 
unclear if there is an online “designer” bank operational at this time, although there has been at least one 
available online recently.  See Debra Saunders, Embryos Made to Order, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 
Aug. 8, 2006, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2006/08/08/EDGOBIQ0G01.DTL. It appears the founder has since closed this 
“bank” due to public pressure and commentary.  See, e.g., Designer Embryos?, available at 
http://moraltheology.blogspot.com/2006/08/designer-embryos.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). 
 
5 See https://www.paypal.com/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2011). 
 
6 Patrick could have opted to store the embryos at an embryo bank using a process known as 
“cryopreservation.”  A January 4, 2011, Google search using “embryo bank storage” generated 343,000 
hits in .28 seconds (examples included: www.sperm1.com, www.spermbankcalifornia.com, and 
www.brussellsivf.be/embryo_bank).  “Cryopreservation” means freezing the embryo for future use.  See 
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a South African fertility clinic7 where the egg is fertilized and implanted into an Indian 
surrogate, also discovered online.8  Patrick regularly monitors ultrasound using Sight 
Speed video link9 and receives weekly email medical updates with portable document 
format attachments (pdfs).10  He connects his laptop computer to his television and 
watches the birth in his living room via Skype.11  He then retains a “guide” to accompany 
the newborn to his local airport where he meets his new baby for the first time.  He pays 
all costs through secure websites.  Patrick created human life through cyberspace.  There 
is nothing “traditional” about potential baby making in the Cyberprocreation era. 
     While this scenario may seem implausible to some, that is only because it is so 
different from how many envision human procreation.  Every technological aspect 
identified is readily available and potential human life is truly just a few cyber links 
away.  That reality raises many issues begging discussion and analysis.  This article 
focuses on two:  embryo donation and surrogacy.  We contend that while the Internet 
increased the availability of, and the market for, human embryos and surrogacy services 
to a larger audience than ever envisioned, it also created significant and unimagined legal 
concerns for embryo donors,12 suppliers,13 surrogates14 and surrogate providers.15  
     Parts I and II of this article provide a background on various assisted reproductive 
technology (ART) procedures and perspective on current applications.  We will see that a 
                                                                                                                                  
David I. Hoffman, et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and Their Availability for Research, 
79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063, 1066 (2003). 
 
7 A January 4, 2011, Google search using “fertility clinic services” generated 24,000,000 hits in .22 seconds 
(examples included www.fertilitycenter-uconn.org, www.americanfertility.com, and 
www.midlandfertility.com). 
 
8 A January 2, 2011, Google search using “surrogacy services” generated 429,000 hits in .26 seconds 
(examples included www.surrogteparenting.com, www.fertlity-docs.com, and www.surrogacyabroad.com). 
 
9 See http://www.sightspeed.com/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2011). 
 
10 See What is a PDF File, available at http://www.kb.iu.edu/data/aftt.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2011). 
 
11 See http://www.skype.com/intl/en-us/features/allfeatures/video-call/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2011). 
 
12 See infra text accompanying note 21. 
 
13 See infra text accompanying note 23. 
 
14 See infra text accompanying note 24. 
 
15 See infra section I. Necessary Caveat. 
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combination of need, technological advancement, cost and process effectiveness, and 
increasing social acceptance will fuel the future use of donor embryos and/or surrogates. 
     Part III discusses the Internet’s impact on ART.  Without question, the Internet 
increased the level of information available on virtually any subject.16  This section 
addresses three significant Cyberprocreation developments.  First, the Internet likely 
creates or influences the idea that people should be, or use, reproductive goods or service 
providers.  Second, it fosters new approaches and developments.  Third, it shapes where 
people pursue ART, a development known as “Reproductive Tourism.”  
     In Part IV we look at international, federal, state, and voluntary association regulation 
of embryo and surrogacy practices.  We will find that despite the significant danger posed 
by defective embryos or inadequate surrogates, along with the investments some 
consumers are willing to incur,17 these areas are the “wild west”18 and largely 
unregulated.  
     Part V analyzes potential parental rights and responsibilities of embryo donors and 
surrogates.  While it will undoubtedly surprise some, it is increasingly likely that 
surrogates may have parental rights and, to the surprise of the surrogate, she may have 
parental responsibilities as well.  Parties may try to address these issues through 
surrogacy contracts, but we will see that there is no guarantee that such agreements will 
be legally enforceable. 
     Finally, Part VI shifts the focus from parentage to product liability.  We analyze 
potential liability for embryo donors and suppliers under breach of warranty, strict 
product liability, and negligence causes of action.  We then assess potential surrogate and 
surrogate provider liability under negligence and breach of contract.  The article 
                                            
16 See, e.g., eHow, http://www.ehow.com, (giving information on such topics as how to milk a goat, how to 
pay for items online, or how to stay awake while racing in the Iditarod); see also HowStuffWorks, Inc., 
http://www.HowStuffWorks.com (providing access to bizarre facts and explanations of how things work). 
 
17 See, e.g., Susan Donaldson James, Bringing Out Baby: Who Pays for IVF?, ABC NEWS, Apr. 8, 2008, 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=4607004&page=1 (last visited Jan. 14, 2011) 
(reporting that Fay Johnson paid for one IVF child by securing a second home mortgage and a second child 
using the couple’s inheritance, and for two failed procedures). 
 
18 See Debra Spar, Taming the Wild West of Assisted Reproduction, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR, Feb. 26, 2009, 
available at http://www.columbiaspectator.com/2009/02/26/taming-wild-west-assisted-reproduction (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2011). 
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concludes with predictions and recommendations as society continues forward in the 
Cyberprocreation Era.  
 
 I.  A NECESSARY CAVEAT 
 
     Readers will quickly realize that much is unsettled, and certainly unknown, in the 
rapidly developing world of ART.  This article represents an important discussion, but 
clear language and consistent use is essential to guide our collaborative journey.  We, 
therefore, provide certain operational definitions before we proceed further: 
 
1. “Embryo” – the prefetal product of human conception from implantation 
through the eighth week of development.19 
 
2. “Designer embryo” – an embryo created to attempt to include or exclude 
certain resulting characteristics.20 
 
3. “Embryo donor” – the person(s) who causes the embryo to exist.21 
 
4.   “Embryo donation” – providing an embryo in exchange for compensation.22 
                                            
19 This definition is appropriate for our discussion; however, the development during this time actually 
encompasses multiple steps with increasing cell division.  Initially the sperm fertilizes one or more eggs, 
resulting in a zygote.  The zygote develops in a blastocyst within a few days.  The blastocyst becomes an 
embryo once it has developed cells to support both the fetus and the placenta.  See How Sex Works,  
available at http://health.howstuffworks.com/sexual-health/sexuality/human-reproduction10.htm (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2010). 
 
20 See, e.g., Couples Offered Designer Babies (PGD Embryo Screening), available at 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2166642/posts) (last visited Dec. 26, 2011). 
 
21 This could actually encompass a wide variety of situations: fertile couples, a couple or individual using 
an egg or sperm donor, or a couple or individual using an egg and sperm donor. 
 
22 While it may seem unusual to define a donor as a person receiving compensation, that is the appropriate 
definition when discussing donation of human reproductive tissues eggs, sperm, or embryos because such 
“donors” are really “sellers”.  As analogies to more established tissue markets, see, e.g., The Egg Donor 
Program, Becoming an Egg Donor, available at http://www.eggdonation.com/becoming-an-egg-
donor/BecominganEggDonor.php) (last visited Jan. 14, 2011) (promising to reward donors with gifts and 
the highest level of compensation); Sperm Donors Inc.,  available at 
http://www.spermdonorsinc.com/Fees.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011) (identifying compensation to sperm 
donors as ranging from $1,000-2,000 depending on qualifications).  
    Embryo donation is different from embryo adoption.  See Brandon S. Mercer, Embryo Adoption: What 
are the Laws, 26 J. Juv. L. 73, 73 (2006) (“[E]mbryo adoption is the ‘donation of frozen embryo(s) from 
one party to a recipient who wishes to bear and raise a child.’ Embryo adoption is simply defined as the 
gifting of embryos.”).  See also Jaime E. Conde, Embryo Donation: The Government Adopts a Cause, 13 
Wm. & Mary J. of Women & L. 273, 279-283 (2006).  But see Paula J. Manning, Baby Needs a New Set of 
Rules: Using Adoption Doctrine to Regulate Embryo Donation, 5 Geo. J. Gender & L. 677, 678 (2004) 
(“The terms ‘embryo donation’ and ‘embryo adoption are synonymous….”).  This contention is frequently 
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5. “Embryo supplier” – the person or entity that provides an embryo to  
     prospective parent(s), but has no biological connection to the embryo.23 
 
6. “Surrogate” – a woman who is paid to act as a replacement for another woman 
     who will not, or cannot, carry a pregnancy through to term.24 
 
7. “Surrogate provider” – an entity providing a surrogate to prospective parent(s). 
 
II. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING CONCEPTION 
 
Traditionally conception occurred through intercourse between a male and 
female, with the male supplying the sperm and the female providing the eggs.  ART is the 
umbrella term for various medical technologies creating conception through means other 
than coital reproduction.  There are a number of ART strategies.25  The oldest and most 
common is Artificial Insemination (AI).26  The next most common is In Vitro 
                                                                                                                                  
well supported by entities that merge the concepts, likely causing confusion.  See, e.g., 
http://www.embryoadoptionn.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) (“The legal process of the transfer of the 
embryos from the donor to the adopter is governed by contract law rather than adoption law. The embryos 
are “owned” by the donating family and “ownership” is given to the adopting family before the embryos 
are thawed and transferred into the adopting mother's womb.  Adoption agencies wrap the protections of 
current adoption practices around the process of embryo donation.”). 
 
23 Common examples are fertility clinics offering embryo donation.  See, e.g., Conceptual Options, 
available at http://www.conceptualoptionn.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
 
24 There are two types of surrogates, “traditional” and “gestational”.  In a traditional surrogacy the 
surrogate’s egg(s) are fertilized by donor semen using IVF and re-implanted in the surrogate’s body.  In a 
traditional surrogacy the surrogate is both the biological mother (as the egg donor) and the birth mother.  In 
a gestational surrogacy the surrogate carries an embryo using an egg donated by a third party.  Here the 
surrogate is the birth mother, but not the biological mother as she is not the egg donor.  The vast majority of 
current surrogacy relationships, perhaps as high as ninety-five percent, are gestational.  See CAROL 
SANGER, DEVELOPING MARKETS IN BABY-MAKING: IN THE MATTER OF BABY M IN CONTRACT STORIES 
127, n. 118 (2007).  One author argues, quite convincingly, that the perception of “baby selling” has 
effectively destroyed the market for traditional surrogates.  See Noa Ben-Asher, The Curing Law: On the 
Evolution of Baby-Making Markets, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1885, 1918-1919 (2009). 
     Surrogacy may also be “commercial” or “altruistic”.  A commercial surrogate is compensated, an 
altruistic surrogate is not.  See Amy M. Larkey, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in 
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 608 (2003). 
 
25 Examples of such techniques include intracytoplasmic sperm injections (ICSI) (injecting a single sperm 
directing into an egg), gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), and 
Intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), embryo transfer, and increasingly, surrogacy.  See DEBORA L. 
SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 
17 (2006).  
 
26 AI is the least intrusive ART procedure.  AI takes previously ejaculated sperm and implants it into a 
woman’s cervix or utrauterine lining.  There are several forms of insemination process such as standard 
vaginal (see Justyn Lezin, (Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women’s Access to 
Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 Hastings Women’s L.J. 185, 191 (2003)) 
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Fertilization (IVF).27  The goal of such procedures is to successfully fertilize a human 
egg, resulting in an embryo.  That embryo may then be stored for future use or implanted 
into a woman’s uterus for gestation.  Gestation may involve the services of a surrogate.  
There is very recent growth in ART practices using embryo donation and/or surrogates28 
and, going forward, these two trends will be increasingly prominent for, at least, four 
reasons.  
     First there is, and will be, increasing need.  This need may be rooted in biology, legal 
constraints, economics, culture, or a combination of these and other factors.  Biologically 
                                                                                                                                  
and intrauterine (see KIM TOEVS & STEPHANIE BRILL, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO LESBIAN CONCEPTION, 
PREGNANCY AND BIRTH 304-5 (2002)).  There are two forms of AI but they differ based on who is 
providing the sperm.  In Artificial Insemination by Husband, the husband is the donor.  In Artificial 
Insemination by Donor, the donor is someone other than the recipient-mother’s husband.  
 
27 IVF (literally meaning “in glass”) requires a sperm donor and a physician’s/clinician’s assistance for 
implantation.  The process begins with hormonal stimulation of a woman’s ovaries to produce multiple 
eggs. This woman may be the intended birth mother or she may be an egg donor who will not carry any 
resulting child.  The eggs are surgically removed and placed in a glass Petri dish.  Sperm are then 
introduced to the eggs.  If successful, the sperm fertilizes the eggs and upon an eight-cell stage, the “pre-
embryo” is transferred to a woman’s uterus by cervical catheter.  See Weldon E. Havins & James J. 
Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating “Non-
Traditional” Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 31 McGeorge L. Rev. 673, 681 (2000).  
 
28 This rapid evolution cannot be over-stated.  As recently as 2004 the President’s Council on Bioethics 
concluded that there was no embryo commerce taking place in the United States.  See Jeffery T. Wise, 
Embryo Banking as a Novel Options for the Infertile? Law Policy, and a Proposed Model Act, 8 Hous. J. 
Health L. & Pol’y 163, n. 82 (2007).  Within 24 months “The World’s First Human Embryo Bank” was 
available online and based in San Antonio, Texas.  This “Bank” was properly known as the Abraham 
Centre of Life. See Rob Stein, Texas Firm First to Offer Ready-Made Embryos, available at 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/headline/metro/4451076.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).  We can 
now obtain embryos from diverse entities including Conceptual Oasis (see 
http://www.conceptualoptionn.com/embryo-donation last visited Jan. 11, 2011), Dream a Baby (see 
http://www.dreamababy.com/embryo-donation.htm last visited Jan. 11, 2011) and Bethany Christian 
Services (see http://www.bethany.org/a55798/bethanywww.nsf/0/12a23f0bc63400a085257289006eb5d6 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2011). 
     Of course, “growth” requires context.  As one article properly notes, surrogacy is one of the least used 
ART procedures (see Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building a Better Baby Business, 10 MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 41, 46 2009)), but this fails to recognize the pronounced increase recently.  See Ronni Berke, 
Single Men Turning to Surrogates, CNN, Dec. 23, 2008, available at 
www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/12/23/single.men.parenting/?iref=mpstoryview) (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) 
(“[T]he Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, representing scores of reproductive clinics, reports 
that the number of gestational surrogate births in the [United States] quadrupled between 1996 and 2006.” 
Id.).  We also note that there are, at least, thirty clinics in the United States offering surrogacy services with 
one boasting more than 1,400 births and another with fifty surrogates available.  See Egg Donor and 
Surrogacy Programs, Infertility Resources for Consumers, available at 
http://www.ihr.com/infertility/provider/donoregg.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).  Additionally domestic 
physicians are increasingly using foreign surrogates.  See infra text accompanying notes 91-98. 
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the fact is that many people have difficulty conceiving,29 and that problem is getting 
worse.30  For some reproduction is biologically impossible, even though there are no 
infertility issues.31  While many people might need embryos or surrogacy services, the 
laws of their domiciles may limit, or prohibit outright, such reproductive assistance, 
forcing them to secure this aid elsewhere.32  Need is frequently financial.  Those unable 
or unwilling33 to carry an embryo to term can hire a surrogate.  There are many women, 
both in the United States34 and abroad35, who need the income surrogacy can provide.36  
                                            
29 An estimated 15% of American women and 10-15% of American men are infertile.  See Spar & 
Harrington, supra note 28, at 44.  
 
30 See U.S. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Population 
Fact Sheet, available at www.cdc.gov (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (reporting that an estimated 7.3 million 
American women aged 15-44 reported some impaired ability to have children in 2002, compared with 6.1 
million in 1995, and 4.9 million in 1988). 
 
31 A significant percentage of those using surrogates are gay men or couples or single, straight men.  See 
Berke, supra note 28 (this article discusses two agencies that have each experienced a fifty percent increase 
in the number of single men using surrogacy services). 
 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 82-84. 
 
33 See Ruby L. Lee, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation, 
20 Hastings Women’s L.J. 275, 282 (2009) (discussing “…the trend of fertile, married, career women 
opting out of bearing their own children in favor of convenience.”) (“An IVF consultant and endoscopist, 
Dr. Sunita Tandulwadkar confirmed that an increasing interest in using surrogates has come from career 
women who do not want to take a break from their careers.”  Id.). 
 
34 See Habiba Nosheen & Hilke Schellmann, The Most Wanted Surrogates in the World, GLAMOUR 
MAGAZINE, Oct. 2010, available at http://www.glamour.com/magazine/2010/10/the-most-wanted-
surrogates-in-the-world) (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (discussing the trend by U.S. military wives to serve as 
surrogates at least in part to supplement family income).  Surrogacy contracts in the United States appear to 
range between $40,000 and $100,000.  See Nick Williams, India Adopts Surrogate Mother Hotspot, 
VIDETTE REP., Nov. 11, 2006, available at 
http://www.videtteonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33247:india-adopts-
surrogate-mother-hotspot&catid=37:newsnationalglobal&Itemid=53, (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).  While 
those numbers may reflect the total contract “price”, actual compensation to the surrogate might be far less.  
See Jennifer L. Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should Surrogate Mothers 
be Compensated for their Services?, 6 Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 529, 531 (2007) (“Currently, the 
typical fee for a first time surrogate mother ranges from $14,000 to $18,000, with an average of $15,000.”  
Id.).  See also the Open Arms Egg Donation and Surrogacy Agency, available at 
http://www.openarmsconsultants.com/index.php?action=sg (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) (this service pays 
surrogates a minimum fee of $18,000). 
     At least one court refused to enforce a surrogacy contract, in part precisely because they were concerned 
about the effect of compensation.  See R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998) 
(“Eliminating any financial reward to a surrogate mother is the only way to assure that no economic 
pressure will cause a woman, who may well be a member of an economically vulnerable class, to act as a 
surrogate.”).  
 
35 See Lee, supra note 33, at 278 (“The average Indian surrogate receives between $2,800 and $5,600 for 
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There are many people who desperately want a child but cannot reproduce and cannot 
afford to pursue IVF.  Embryos and/or surrogates may provide the only options.  Finally, 
need may be cultural as well, particularly when infertility brings shame.37  Although 
there is no published data, anecdotally it appears that the use of surrogates has grown 
exponentially over just the past few years.38  
                                                                                                                                  
her services. That is roughly equal to ten years salary for rural Indian women.” Id.)  See also Krittivas 
Mukherjee, Rent-a-Womb in India Fuels Debate, EZILON INFOBASE, Dec. 10, 2010, available at 
http://www.ezilon.com/information/article_17613.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) (“[A] surrogate is paid 
anything between $3,000 and $6,000, a fortune in a country with an annual per capita income of around 
$500.”) 
 
36 See, e.g., Margot Cohen, A Search for a Surrogate Leads to India, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2009, at W8, 
available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704252004574459003279407832.html?KEYWORDS=M
argot+Cohen) (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (discussing one Indian woman’s decision to be a surrogate 
because “[H]aving someone else’s child sounded like a better option than her other plan: selling a kidney.” 
Id.)   
    While there is some information regarding surrogates and financial need, there is little publicly available 
regarding embryo donors, but we gain some insight from recent human egg donation trends. Fertility clinics 
report a dramatic increase in the number of egg donations and procedures performed each year.  This is 
particularly true during the recent economic times.  Fertility clinics nationwide report a significant increase 
in the number of donors coming forward.  See, e.g., Stephanie Smith, Dim Economy Drives Women to 
Donate Eggs for Profit, CNN NEWS, Aug. 8, 2008, available at 
http://cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/08/05/selling.eggs/index.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) (reporting Chicago 
clinics fielding 30 to 50 inquiries a day from potential donors compared to the prior year’s 10 to 30, while 
the Reproductive Science Center of the Bay Area received 158 calls in July 2008, in contrast to 120 in July 
2007);  see Juju Chang and Kiran Khalid, Less Money Means More Egg Donors, ABC NEWS, Oct. 27, 
2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/OnCall/story?id=6119578&page=1 (last visited Jan. 17, 
2011) (stating fertility experts throughout the country reported a 30% to 40% increase in applicants); see 
also Judy Keen, Recession Finds Fertile Field of Egg, Sperm Donors, U.S.A. TODAY, July 7, 2009, at 1A 
(reporting that Health News, an Irvine, California company that operates a national donor referral service, 
had a 40% increase since February, 2008).  As of 2008 more than 100,000 young women sold or donated 
eggs to approximately 470 IVF clinics in the United States.  See W. Kramer, et al., U.S. Oocyte Donors: A 
Retrospective Study of Medical and Psychosocial Issues, OXFORD J. OF HUM. REPROD., vol 24, No. 12, at 
3144, available at http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/12/3144.full (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). 
 
37 As an example, in Japan infertility carries serious social stigma, adoption is frowned upon, and clinics 
cannot provide surrogates.  As a result, at least one American fertility center has been recruiting Asian 
American women to serve as surrogates for Japanese clients for the past several years. See Mark Alpert, 
New U.S. Export to Japan: Babies, FORTUNE, Aug. 10, 1992, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1992/08/10/76762/index.htm, (last visited Dec. 
30, 2010).  Japanese customers use Indian surrogates a well.  See, e.g., Japanese Girl Born to Indian 
Surrogate Arrives Home, CNN WORLD NEWS, Nov. 2, 2008, available at http://articles.cnn.com/2008-11-
02/world/india.baby_1_indian-law-japanese-girl-jaipur?_s=PM:WORLD) (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). 
 
38 See Cohen, supra note 36 (“Robert Rupak, president of PlanetHospital, a California-based medical-
tourism country, says that in the first eight months of [2009] he sent 600 couples or single parents overseas 
for surrogacy, nearly three times the number in 2008 and up from just 33 in 2007.”) See also Surrogate 
Mothers: Outsourcing Pregnancy in India, MERINEWS, June 26, 2008, available at 
http://www.merinews.com/article/surrogate-mothers-outsourcing-pregnancy-in-india/136421.shtml) (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2010); Lorraine Ali, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2008, available 
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Many ART procedures are now so common that we lose perspective of how recently they 
came into existence. America celebrated the birth of its first IVF-conceived baby in 
1981;40 just twenty-five years later at least 54,656 babies were born in the United States 
using IVF and IVF-related procedures.41 We have only been able to store human eggs 
since 2004.42  In 2007, the world’s first in vitro maturation babies were born.43 We may 
have even gotten to the point where women do not need men to create babies.44 There is 
                                                                                                                                  
at http://www.newsweek.com/2008/03/29/the-curious-lives-of-surrogates.html) (last visited Jan. 2, 2011); 
and Foreign Couples Turn to India for Surrogate Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/asia/04iht-mother.1.10690283.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2010).  
 
39 This may be particularly true of medical technology regarding embryos. See generally Liza Mundy, 
Souls on Ice: America’s Embryo Glut and the Wasted Promise of Stem Cell Research, MOTHER JONES, 
July/August 2006, available at http://motherjones.com/politics/2006/07/souls-ice-americas-embryo-glut-
and-wasted-promise-stem-cell-research (last visited Jan. 14, 2011) (This article discusses a wide range of 
recent developments, including the combination of more effective fertility drugs and laboratory procedures 
producing more embryos per cycle, implantation procedures using fewer embryos, and the fact that a 
woman recently gave birth using an embryo that had been frozen for 13 years. The last occurrence 
underscores how unclear the future of embryo storage and usage really is, as professionals do not even 
know how long frozen embryos will be “good for” going forward.) See also Conceived Together, Born 11 
Years Apart: Deep-frozen Third Sister Arrives After Record Gap, available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1341766/Conceived-born-11-years-apart-Deep-frozen-sister-
arrives-record-gap.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2010). 
 
40 Miss Elizabeth Carr was born in Norfolk, Virginia on December 28, 1981. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE 
BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 17, 28 
(2006). 
 
41 See CENTERS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
(ART) REPORT: SECTION 5 – ART TRENDS, 1996-2006 (hereinafter “2006 ART Trends”), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/section5.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 
42 See Aina Hunter, Why Worry? Put Your Eggs on Ice! ABC NEWS, April 9, 2008, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=4591877&page=1 (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). The difficulty with 
storing eggs is that eggs have high water content that tends to produce destructive ice crystals in the egg 
when frozen. Id. While data is limited, one study showed that eggs survive the new storage process 85% of 
the time. See also Cherie Black, Seattle Women Now Have Option to Freeze Eggs, available at 
wwwseattlepi.com/printer2/index.asp?ploc=t&refer=http://www.seattlepi.com/local/350763_eggfreezing11
.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
 
43 In vitro maturation (“IVM”) is similar to IVF. The key difference is that, in IVF, the egg donor is placed 
on hormones to stimulate their ovaries and the eggs are withdrawn when mature. In IVM no hormones are 
used and the eggs are removed before maturation. See Tracy Connor, Have a Baby at New Low, Low Price, 
Says Fertility Doctor Joel Batzofin, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2009/04/13/2009-04-
13_have_a_baby_at_new_low_low_price.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). 
 
44 In 2009 British researchers announced that they had taken stem cells from an embryo and used them to 
create human sperm. See Sperm from Stem Cells, CBS NEWS, July 9, 2009, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/09/uttm/main5148372.shtml (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (“Sperm 
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little reason to doubt that we will regularly see regular such ART “miracles” going 
forward or that the use of reproductive technology will continue to increase. 
     The third driving force is the cost and process effectiveness of purchasing embryos 
and/or using surrogacy services relative to IVF.  IVF based procedures are not single, 
point-in-time activities; they are more accurately a series of steps over different periods 
of time.  The Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) refers to these as “cycles of 
treatment”45 or, for purposes of this article, “cycles.”  The average cost for a single cycle 
of IVF is $10,000-12,000, but can reach as much as $25,000 if features such as donor 
gametes or intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) are added.46  And, while the rate of 
success has grown considerably, most women need more than one cycle to accomplish 
pregnancy.47 It is not uncommon for a person or couple to spend $100,000 just 
attempting to conceive using traditional IVF based procedures.48  Making IVF even more 
cost prohibitive is the fact that the vast majority of states do not require insurance 
companies to cover, or offer coverage for, infertility diagnosis and treatment.49  Using 
                                                                                                                                  
could be produced from female stem cells. That would mean women would no longer need men to create 
babies.”) 
 
45 “Because ART consists of several steps over an interval of approximately two weeks, an ART procedure 
is more appropriately considered a cycle of treatment rather than a procedure at a single point in time.” See 
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS 
RATES NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS (2008) (hereinafter CDC SUCCESS RATES), at 
4, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/508PDF/2006ART.pdf, (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
 
46 See Marcia C. Inhorn & Michael Hassan Fakih, Arab Americans, African Americans, and Infertility: 
Barriers to Reproduction and Medical Care, 85 Fertility & Sterility 844 (2006) (estimating the mean cost 
of IVF in the United States in 2002 at $9,547). Cost varies by region and clinic. Id.  
 
47 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2005 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
SUCCESS RATES NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS (hereinafter 2005 ART Report), 6, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2009). 
Ironically success rates actually decrease with each additional cycle.  Id. at 17.  
 
48 See Spar, supra note 18, at 46. This is true even when the patient knows the probability of success is low. 
See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 
609, 632 (1997). Patients are frequently willing to pay nearly $30,000 for a 10% chance of having a baby. 
See Melinda B. Henne et al., The Combined Effect of Age and Basal Follicle-Stimulating Hormone on the 
Cost of a Live Birth at Assisted Reproductive Technology, 89 Fertility & Sterility 104, 107 (2008). 
 
49 See 50 State Summary of State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Therapy, Nat'l. 
Conference of State Legislatures, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/50infert.htm (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
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embryos and/or surrogates may decrease total costs, perhaps by 50% or more,50 while 
also increasing the likelihood of success.51  
     Finally, ART use is increasingly common and possibly more socially acceptable.52  In 
1996, there were 64,681 ART cycles performed in the United States,53 by 2008 that 
number increased to 148,055 resulting in 46,326 live births (deliveries of one or more 
living infants) and 61,426 infants.54  Although ART use is still relatively rare, it has 
doubled over the past decade.55  
     It is also, arguably, acceptable not only to use ART to try to create life, but to attempt 
to create life through designer embryos.56  While some contend there is no need for such 
                                            
50 The Abraham Center (see Stein, supra note 28) charged $2,500 per embryo and estimated total costs for 
a pregnancy at $10,000.  See also Wise supra notes 28, 37.  
 
51 See http://www.embryoadoptionn.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). (“A recent study in the medical journal 
Fertility and Sterility shows an average 35% pregnancy success rate using frozen embryos vs. an average 
32% for fresh [IVF] cycles.”)  We were unable to locate the study referenced.  Further, while we cannot say 
that it is a well-established medical fact, designer embryos may have higher pregnancy success rates than 
non-designer embryos, particularly when the egg and sperm come from donors with an established track 
record of achieved pregnancies.  See Wise, supra note 28, at 21 (“[T]hey can increase the chance of a 
successful pregnancy from approximately thirty percent to an impressive seventy percent.” Id.)  
 
52 Examples of celebrities who publicly acknowledge using IVF to conceive include David and Courtney 
Cox, Marcia Cross, Penn Jillette, while Angela Bassett, Robert DeNiro, Peri Gilpin, Kelsey Grammar, and 
Deidre Hall used surrogates. See No Baby on Board, available at www.nobabyonboard.com/moviestv.html 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2011).   It may even be the case that ART discussions have become social events.  See 
Non-profit Organization Holds Egg Donor/Surrogacy Event in Popular Beverly Hills Nail Salon:  Need an 
egg donor? How about a surrogate? Know someone who does? Yes? Then this event is for you (an 
invitation to a program “…designed to deliver sensitive and important information about surrogacy and egg 
donation in a casual, relaxed setting, where participants enjoy complimentary manicures, pedicure, and 
martinis.”) available at http://www.gaynewswire.com/nonprofit-organization-holds-egg-donorsurrogacy-
event-popular-beverly-hills-nail-salon/6192 (last visited Dec. 29, 2010). 
 
53 See supra note 41.  
 
54 See http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2010). 
 
55 Id. 
 
56 We say “arguably” because there are certainly opinions to the contrary.  See, e.g., Joyce E. Cutler, 
Designer Baby Offer to Screen Embryos for Eye, Hair, Skin Pigmentation Dropped (discussing a California 
fertility clinic’s decision to withdraw its screening plan due to “…apparent negative social impacts.”) and 
Daniel Martin, Couple Pay 9,000 to Have First British Web Baby, available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-429393/Couple-pay-9-000-British-web-baby.html (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2011) (“Stephen Green, national director of Christian Voice, said ‘The objection to the idea of 
designer babies is that it divorces procreation form the act of sexual congress, and there is a real sense in 
which it is playing God.’”).  
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embryos57 the reality is that there will be demand for three reasons.  First, while there are 
embryos in storage,58 the vast majority is unavailable to prospective parent(s).59   Second, 
even if those embryos were readily available, there are questions about potential 
viability.60 Third, it is simply ridiculous to discount the reality that would-be parents 
hope to “produce” a child with certain characteristics or abilities.61 
 
III. SYMBIOSIS 
 
     The embryo market is, at least domestically, a very recent development62 and 
surrogate use increased dramatically over the past few years.63 The logical explanation 
for these developments is the Internet. As recently as 1999 people advertised in 
                                            
57 See, e.g., The Slope is Really Slippery, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Mar. 24, 2007, available at 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2007/march/24.29.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).  
 
58 Id. (alleging that there are some 500,000 embryos in cryopreservation in the United States).  
 
59 See Susan Crockin, How do you “Adopt” a Frozen Egg? available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/12/04/how_do_you_adopt_a_froz
en_egg/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2011): 
 
According to a 2003 study, approximately 88 % of those frozen embryos are still under  
the active control of the patients who created them and are still trying to create a family  
with them. Of the remaining embryos, only about 2 % of patients were found to actually  
choose to donate their embryos to another family for procreation -- likely, at least in part,  
from discomfort over donating their born child's potential genetic sibling. In my own  
practice and those of many of my colleagues, almost 75 % of patients who seriously  
consider donation ultimately decide not to donate to another family. 
 
60 See Jennalee Ryan, The World’s First Embryo Bank, FREE REPUBLIC, June 25, 2006, available at 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1676440/posts (last visited Jan. 29, 2011) 
 
61 See, e.g., Joan O’C.Hamilton, What are the Costs?, STANFORD MAGAZINE, Nov/Dec 2000, available at 
http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2000/novdec/articles/eggdonor.html (last visited Jan. 14, 
2011): 
[F]uturistic scenarios of parents-in-waiting “constructing” a child already have arrived. Scouring 
a website where they can select donors, hopeful couples can quickly get caught up in comparison 
shopping, where physical features are the stock in trade. “Couples who would have been looking 
for someone with a lovely character before [the Internet] now say, 'Well, we like No. 98, but 
haven't you got someone with a bluer eye?'” 
 
It may even be the case that prospective parents desire characteristics that may not commonly be perceived 
as desirable. See Sarah-Jay Templeton, Deaf Demand Right to Designer Deaf Children, available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/health/article3087367.ece (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). 
 
62 See supra note 38. 
 
63 Id. 
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newspapers for human tissue donors64 and only 40% of the American population aged 
16-years and older accessed the Internet.65  Ten-years later, 74% did66 and the United 
States currently has more than 266,224,500 Internet users.67 Global Internet use increased 
444.8% from 2000 to 2010.68 As of June 2010, there were approximately 1,966,514,816 
Internet users worldwide.69  In 1993 the United States ART industry was estimated at 
$164 million per year.70  By 2010, that figure grew to at least $1.7 billion.71  Eighty 
percent of adult Internet users seek health information online72 and reproductive health 
questions are one of the most common areas of interest.73  It is no coincidence that 
Internet usage and ART growth mirror each other.  The fact is that the Internet allows 
prospective ART buyers and sellers to find each other in ways unimaginable even a 
decade ago.  But the Internet is not only providing ART access it is shaping, at least, 
three significant ART ideas. 
     First, many ART buyers and sellers find each other online, but that pre-supposes 
awareness of the existence of the “other party”. While it is impossible to quantify, there is 
                                            
64 That year a married couple put ads in the Harvard and Princeton newspapers seeking an egg donor who 
was 5’10” or taller and who had scored over 1400 on her SATs. See Barbara Katz Rothman, The Potential 
Cost of the Best Genes Money Can Buy, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., June 11, 1999, at A52. 
 
65 See Internet Use (U.S.), INTELLIQUEST, May 23, 1999, available at http://www.media-
awareness.ca/english/resources/research_documents/statistics/internet/internet_use.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 
2011). 
 
66 See Sydney Jones, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, Jan. 29, 2009, available at 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1093/generations-online) (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).  
 
67 See http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2011). 
 
68 Id. 
 
69 Id. 
 
70 See Judith Gaines, A Scandal of Artificial Insemination, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 7, 1990, § 6, at 23.  
 
71 See Spar & Harrington, supra note 28, at 47.  
 
72 See Nathan Cortez, Patients Without Borders: The Emerging Global Market for Patients and the 
Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 Ind. L.J. 71, 85 (2008) (citing Harris Interactive, Number of 
“Cyberchondriacs”- Adults Who Have Ever Gone Online for Health Information-Increases to an Estimated 
136 Million Nationwide). Searching health information ranks behind only email use and consumer goods 
and services searches online. Id.  
 
73 See Wolfgang Himmel, et al., Information Needs and Visitors' Experience of an Internet Expert Forum 
on Infertility, available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1550645 (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2011).  
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no doubt that some people get the initial idea to pursue ART activities from the 
Internet.74 
     Second, the Internet fosters the idea that ART is not limited to any traditional 
audience. Originally IVF was for married women under the age of 35 who suffered 
specific physiological problems and could not conceive naturally.75 The Internet makes 
ART developments available to broader constituencies. Prominent user groups now 
include non-married, career heterosexual women,76 gay77 or lesbian78 couples, 
individuals,79 and straight single men.80 The Internet also cultivates the development of 
“radical” ART concepts.81 
                                            
74 See Want to Buy My Eggs for $4,000?, available at 
http://www.sgclub.com/singapore/eggs_4000_china_188402.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). While there 
are no documented cases, it is difficult to believe that ideas such as purchasing embryos, much less 
designer embryos, and becoming a surrogate were not created by people doing online research in areas 
ranging from “infertility” to simple current events. 
 
75 See, e.g., Liza Mundy, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE: HOW ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IS CHANGING OUR 
WORLD, 27 (1st ed. 2007) (“We limited our cases at first to those women who had had their Fallopian tubes 
removed…”)  
 
76 See Deborah Apton, More Women Choosing Single Motherhood, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=1995278&page=1 (last visited Jan. 15, 2011)  
(“California Cryobank, one of the largest sperm banks in the country, reports that single women make up 
32 % of the clients who buy sperm from its bank.”). 
 
77 There is a gay men’s baby boom developing fed by the Internet See Stephen H. Miller, Gay Men’s Baby 
Boom, available at http://www.indegayforum.org/news/show/26805.html) (last visited Aug. 9, 2009). See 
also Guy Ringer, M.D., Gay Man, Gay Dad: Gay Men Can Become Fathers, available at 
http://www.theafa.org/library/article/gay_man_gay_dad_gay_men_can_become_fathers/ (last visited Aug. 
9, 2009).  
 
78 See Paula Amato, M.D. & Marcy Casey Jacob, M,D., Providing Fertility 
Services to Lesbian Couples: The Lesbian Baby Boom (2004), available at 
http://www.srmjournal.org/article/S1546-2501(04)00106-9/fulltext (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (“Thirty to 
50% of lesbian women of child-bearing age wish to become parents, and given the current social trends 
toward same-sex marriage, many will seek to do so with the help of a sperm donor.”) There are clinics that 
market services specifically to lesbian couples and individuals.  See, e.g., 
http://www.thiemd.com/infertility.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).  See also http://www.co-
parentmatch.com/sperm_donors/lesbian_sperm_donors.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).  
 
79 See Berke, supra note 28.  
 
80 Id. 
 
81 See, e.g., Martin, supra n. 58 (discussing the Abraham Center, the “World’s First Embryo Bank” who 
marketed its services, and attracted clients, online.  The Center was based in Texas. Its first two successful 
procedures involved women from Canada and California and quickly gained potential clients from 
England).  
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Third, the Internet is epicenter of the idea of Reproductive Tourism (“RT”). While 
authors discuss the concept of RT differently,82 here it means “citizens of one country 
using reproductive technologies in another.” Commentators address restrictions driving 
RT users across borders (such as situations where treatment is unavailable83 or 
procedures are locally illegal),84 but users pursue RT for a variety of reasons85 including 
lack of local medical expertise, lengthy waiting lists,86 cost considerations,87 and 
                                                                                                                                  
 
82 See, e.g., Guido Pennings, Legal Harmonization and Reproductive Tourism in Europe, 19 Human 
Reproduction 2689, 2990 (2004) (“…the practice of citizens leaving their home country for another in 
hopes of receiving treatment that has been banned in their home country, typically for safety or moral 
reasons”).  The basis of this definition likely comes from Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Recent 
Advances in Medically Assisted Conception: Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues, 17 Am. J.L. & Med. 329, 
333 (1991) (defining “procreative tourism” as people traveling to exercise “…personal reproductive 
choices in less restrictive states.”) 
 
83 Sometimes procedures are “unavailable” because medical personnel simply refuse to perform them. See, 
e.g., Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Reproductive Technology Programs, 
83 Fertility & Sterility 61 (2005) (survey reporting that one in five treatment providers refuse treatment to 
unmarried women); Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DePaul J. Health Care L. 147, 
150 (2000) (“The most common and the most significant barrier that gays and lesbians face when trying to 
access reproductive technologies is physician discrimination and refusal to provide treatment.”). In addition 
to direct discrimination – refusal to provide treatment, same-sex couples face statutes that prohibit 
insurance payments for in-vitro procedures unless for instance, the treatment is rendered upon their lawful 
spouse. See States Summary of Legislation Related to Infertility Insurance Coverage, available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14391 (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 
84 “[R]egulation that is overly restrictive towards the practice of surrogacy has not eliminated the practice. 
Rather it has boosted demand for [reproductive] tourism.” See supra note 33, at 285.  
 
85 See Elizabeth Ferrari Morris, Reproductive Tourism and the Role of the European Union, 8 Chi. J. Int’l L 
701, 703 (2008). For a comprehensive discussion see supra note 74, at 71. 
 
86 See A Growing Number of Brits Cross the Atlantic for Donor Egg IVF Treatment at Shady Grove 
Fertility Center, PR NEWSWIRE, June 16, 2009, available at 
http://news.prnewswire.com/ViewContent.aspx?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/06-16-
2009/0005044891&EDATE (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (“In the UK, where egg donors are neither paid nor 
guaranteed anonymity, donor eggs are scarce, wait times can be as long as three years and choice of donor 
is limited.”) Some clinics exist precisely because countries have more demand than supply.  See, e.g., 
Shady Grove Fertility, available at http://www.shadygrovefertility.com/international (last visited Jan. 15, 
2011). 
 
87 Fertility treatments in foreign countries may be significantly cheaper. As an example, the average cost for 
a cycle of IVF is $10,500 in the United States.  That same treatment costs $5,100 in Cyprus, $4,200 in 
Argentina, and almost 80% less, $2,200, in India.  See http://www.visitandcare.com/infertility-treatment-
abroad/guides/treatment/ivf-with-sperm-donation/cost (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).  Prospective users can 
comparison shop online utilizing estimated costs and user reviews. See, e.g., You are Comparing IVF (In-
Vitro Fertilization) Traveling from the USA, available at 
http://www.allmedicaltourism.com/usa/fertility/ivf-in-vitro-
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convenience.88 RT is a prevalent,89 and based on growth patterns, soon to be an enormous 
ART/Internet consideration because the Internet “facilitates nearly all facets of medical 
tourism.”90  
     It is almost impossible to fathom the future explosion of RT but, while data is limited, 
the projections for India provide some perspective. In 2003, India’s Finance Minister 
announced his country’s goal to become a “global health destination.”91 An estimated 
150,000 medical tourists visited India in 2005, but that number was projected to increase 
to 450,000 by 2008.92 Perhaps more telling is that India’s RT segment of medical tourism 
was approximately $450 million per year in 2006 and is projected to grow by 600% in the 
near future.93 A significant portion of this growth is attributable to the Internet, 
specifically user-friendly websites94 and effective, although not necessarily reliable,95 
                                                                                                                                  
fertilization/?mic=m62tl88kjf&gclid=CNmwwYWOrpwCFQMNDQodIWSM7w (last visited Jan. 15, 
2011). 
 
88 Foreign clinics use online promotions to target frazzled, infertile couples with an attractive combination: 
fertility treatments and vacation. See e.g., My IVF Alternative, available at 
http://www.myivfalternative.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (offering “vacation style” IVF procedures in 
the Czech Republic); Go Sculptura, available at 
http://www.ivfmexicoexperts.com/conversion/mexico_conv_fertility.htm?OVRAW=IVF%20Vacation&O
VKEY=ivf%20abroad&OVMTC=advanced&OVADID=44419002522&OVKWID=220392856522) (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2011) (offering a “pleasurable” IVF vacation experience in Mexico).  
 
89 “Reproductive Tourism has become an unmistakable part of the European landscape.” See supra note 87, 
at 712. 
 
90 See supra note 74, at 85. 
 
91 See Rupa Chinai & Rahul Goswami, Medical Visas Mark Growth of Indian Medical Tourism, 85 Bull of 
World Health Org. 161 (2007), available at www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/3/07-010307/en/index.html 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 
92 Id. 
 
93 See Usha Rengachary Smerdon, The Baby Market: Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International 
Surrogacy Between the United States and India, 39 Cumb. L. Rev. 15, 24 (2008); Linda F. Powers, 
Leveraging Medical Tourism, THE SCIENTIST, Mar. 2006, at 79.  
 
94 See supra note 73, at 85-86: 
 
Virtually every hospital that caters to foreign patients has an English Web site.  
And these Web sites are increasingly functional. Many allow patients to  
schedule treatments, book hotels and airfare, and even contact their surgeon.  
Patients can also find medical tourism brokers on the Internet that will liaise with  
foreign hospitals and make travel arrangements. 
 
95 See supra note 94, at 30: 
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online advertising.96 The United States, while not attempting to grow RT as India, still 
has a $3 billion dollar per year industry97 and many domestic physicians are increasingly 
embracing aspects of RT.98 
 
IV. Regulation99 
 
“[T]he plain fact is that medical technologies have raced ahead of the law 
without the heed of the general public or legislators.”100 
 
     In this section we examine international, federal, state, and voluntary association 
regulation, or lack thereof, regarding embryo donation and surrogacy services. While it 
would be convenient to address the same directives at each level, we do not have that 
luxury as regulation ranges from chaotic to non-existent. Accordingly we are left 
attempting to address two general, but significant, topics in each of the following 
subsections. First, is there embryo “regulation” and, if so, what is regulated? Second, is 
there surrogacy “regulation” and, if so, what is regulated?  
 
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
     There is little international regulation of human embryos. What does exist primarily 
focuses on the length of time embryos can be stored. Storage may be prohibited 
                                                                                                                                  
 
Many Indian ART practitioners and fertility tourism agencies have created websites  
that “are designed to function as marketing tools for medical tourism, to attract  
patients from around the world to India and more importantly, to the clinic. It is  
difficult to distinguish actual information from marketing strategies, as the two  
often appear to be indistinguishable”.  Id. at 30. 
 
96 “Between 2004 and 2006, the number of websites advertising ART more than quadrupled with marketing 
heavily geared to foreigners.” Id. at 24.  
 
97 See Mundy, supra note 76, at 4.  
 
98 See supra note 36 (“Robert Rupak, president of PlanetHospital, a California-based medical-tourism 
country, says that in the first eight months of [2009] he sent 600 couples or single parents overseas for 
surrogacy, nearly three times the number in 2008 and up from just 33 in 2007.”) 
 
99 While we will discuss aspects of embryo regulation in this section, we will not address specific stem cell 
issues as those are beyond the scope of this article. 
 
100 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 9B U.L.A. (as amended 2002) (UPA 2002), comment on Art. 8, Gestational 
Agreement, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/final2002.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 
2011). 
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entirely,101 limited to one-year,102 two-years,103 three-years,104 five-years,105 ten-years,106 
or unlimited.107 
     There is more developed surrogacy regulation, both by action and inaction. Some 
countries flatly prohibit it;108 others regulate surrogacy by prohibiting compensation to 
surrogates,109 while still others allow surrogate compensation.110 Many countries, likely 
even most, have no national regulation.111  
 
B. FEDERAL LAW 
                                            
101 That country is Italy. It also bans the use of donor egg or sperm and prohibits freezing embryos for later 
use. See Healthy Living, available at www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/reprod/hc-sc/general/international-eng.php 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 
102 Austria and Denmark. See Embryo Bank, available at www.ivf-worldwide.com/Education/embryo-
bank.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2011). 
 
103 Belarus, the Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland, and the Ukraine. Id. 
 
104 Norway and Sweden. Id. 
 
105 Belgium, Croatia, France, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. Id. 
 
106 Finland, Israel, and Spain. Id. 
 
107 Such as the United States. Id. 
 
108 Austria, China, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Vietnam. See IVF-Surrogacy (Worldwide) available at 
www.ivf-woldwide.com/Education/surrogacy-rw.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2011). 
 
109 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Id. 
 
110 India, Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan (Id.) and Israel (see Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: 
Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 Hastings L.J. 295 (2005). 
 
111 Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Columbia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, United States, 
Uruguay, Venezuela (see supra n. 110) and Ireland (see Eric Scott Sills and Clifford M. Healy, Building 
Irish Families Through Surrogacy: Medical and Judicial Issues for the Advanced Reproductive 
Technologies, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2585562/ (last visited Dec. 30, 
2010). 
   This simply means there is nothing preventing commercial surrogacy in these countries; certainly some 
provide such services. See, e.g., The Latest About Surrogacy in South Africa, available at 
http://www.prlog.org/10512636-the-latest-about-surrogacy-in-south-africa.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2011); 
Surrogacy and Adoption in Thailand, available at http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=19371 (last visited Jan. 
4, 2011); Womb for Hire, available at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/special-report/06/16/09/womb-hire-
part-1 (last visited Jan. 4, 2010) (discussing the first commercial surrogacy in the Philippines).  It is also 
possible that there is some regulation at the state or territorial levels.  See, e.g., supra note 102 (discussing 
regulation in Australia and noting that Victoria prohibits compensated surrogacy and Queensland prohibits 
all surrogacy.). 
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     One author asserts that there are federal laws requiring “strict medical and genetic 
screenings of the [embryo] donating couple to determine the embryo’s viability and 
whether the couple is ‘free of any genetic and communicable diseases.’”112  If such 
comprehensive legislation exists, we cannot find it.  In fact the opposite is possible; there 
may be no federal laws address embryo donor screening.  We contend that statutory 
language and commentary demonstrates there is some embryo screening and storage 
legislation, though it is minimal.  
     The federal government oversees assisted reproduction and genetic testing through 
three agencies: the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (“CMS”),113 and the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”).  The 
FDA’s term “other reproductive tissue” should encompass embryos.114  Even if that is 
correct, there are no more than two regulations regarding embryo collection and storage.  
The first merely mandates that all “establishments” engaged in the collection, processing, 
storage and distribution of human embryos have their donors screened and tested for 
H.I.V., Hepatitis B & C, Chlamydia trachomatis and Neisseria gonorrhea.115  The second 
                                            
112 See Alexia M. Baiman, Cryopreserved Embryos as America’s Prospective Adoptees: Are Couples Truly 
“Adopting” or Merely Transferring Property Rights?, 16 Wm. & Mary J. of Women & L. 133, 138 (2009). 
 
113 Laboratory testing is largely governed by the CMS. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.55, .80 (2006).  
 
114 See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d)(3): 
 
Human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue-based products (HCT/Ps) means articles containing or 
consisting of human cells or tissues that are intended for implantation, transplantation, infusion, 
or transfer into a human recipient. Examples of HCT/Ps include, but are not limited to, bone, 
ligament, skin, dura mater, heart valve, cornea, hematopoietic stem/progenitor cells derived from 
peripheral and cord blood, manipulated autologous chondrocytes, epithelial cells on a synthetic 
matrix, and semen or other reproductive tissue (emphasis added). 
 
See also Human Tissue Intended for Transplantation, 21 C.F.R. § 1270 (2000); Human Cells, Tissues, and 
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment Registration and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 5447 (Jan. 19, 
2001) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1 et seq. (2005): 
 
Several comments questioned the need for the regulation of reproductive cells and tissues, citing 
current oversight from professional organizations, other Federal agencies, and States. Comments 
opposed registration for programs involved in egg donation, egg retrieval, semen processing, 
semen evaluation, or in vitro fertilization (IVF) in assisted reproductive technologies.  
We stand by our decision to extend regulatory requirements to reproductive cells and tissue.  
 
115 21 C.F.R. § 1271.85(a), (c) (2006).  
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states only that human tissue must be stored at an “appropriate temperature.”116  While 
these regulations are nominal and vague, such deficiencies might be explained by 
accidental over-sight, but the federal government had an opportunity to clearly establish 
embryo quality control regulation and chose not do so. 
     The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 (“FCSRCA”) 
authorized the Secretary of Health and Human Services to issue regulations establishing 
certification standards and procedures for embryo laboratories.117  The Act defined an 
“embryo laboratory” as “a facility in which human oocytes and sperm, or embryos, are 
subject to ART laboratory procedures.”118  However nothing in the FCSRCA establishes 
standards or procedures for quality control practices; instead it only requires that fertility 
clinics report annual ART success rates.119  In sum, if there is any federal embryo quality 
control regulation, it is minimal120 and this minimal level is intentional.  
     There is no federal surrogacy legislation121 but there is one possibility in terms of 
“national” scope, the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”).  The most recent incarnation of 
that Act was in 2002 (“UPA2002”).122  That Act recognized the need for clarification 
regarding parentage and surrogacy.123  UPA 2002 mandated that surrogacy agreements 
                                            
116 21 C.F.R. § 1271.260(2)(b). 
 
117 See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATE AND CERTIFICATION ACT OF 1992; Proposed 
Model Program for the Certification of Embryo Laboratories, 60178, available at  
http://wwwn.cdc.gov/dls/art/fr06no98n.txt (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 
118 Id. at 60181.  
 
119 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7 (2009). The Act has been termed by one author as “…governmental 
regulation at is weakest”. See Brenda Reddis-Smalls, Assessing the Markey for Human Reproductive Tissue 
Alienability: Why Can We Sell Our Eggs, but Not Our Livers?, 10 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 643, 658 
(2008). It is hard to dispute this contention. To give perspective, in addition to its failure to establish quality 
control procedures, it was not even funded until four years after enactment. Id.  
 
120 At least one author flatly contends there is none. See Helen M. Alvare, The Case for Regulating 
Collaborative Reproduction: A Children’s Rights Perspective, 40 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 28 (2003). 
 
121 See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Gestation: Work for Hire or the Essence of Motherhood? A Comparative 
Legal Analysis, 9 Duke J. Gender L. & Policy 91, 103 (2002). 
 
122 See generally supra note 100, UNIF. PARENTAL ACT 9B U.L.A  (AS AMENDED 2002), comment on Art. 8, 
GESTATIONAL AGREEMENTS, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/final2002.htm 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2011).  
. 
123 See generally supra note 100, UPA 2002, Comment on Art. 7 CHILD OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, 
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were not void per se,124 defined that a surrogate may be paid for her services,125 and 
clarified that gestational surrogate services were not “baby selling.”126 It further specified 
that the intended parents of a child born pursuant to an approved surrogacy agreement 
were, with judicial approval, the legal parents of the child.127 While ambitious, the Act 
does not provide definitive guidance. To date only nine states enacted it, none of them 
without change,128 and at least two of those states did not adopt Article 8, the provision 
addressing gestational agreements.129 There is no case law interpreting UPA 2002 and its 
comments. 
 
C. STATE LAW 
 
     There is very little specific state embryo regulation and what does exist is inconsistent 
and frequently nebulous. Few states have attempted, or are attempting, to define the legal 
status of embryos.130 That status is a particularly compelling issue on many levels but, for 
                                                                                                                                  
([T]housands of children are born each year pursuant to [surrogacy] agreements.  One thing is clear, a child 
born under these circumstances is entitled to have its status clarified.”) 
 
124 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 9B U.L.A. (AS AMENDED 2002), at comment following §801. 
 
125 Id. at § 801(e). 
 
126 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 9B U.L.A. (AS AMENDED 2002), at comment following §801. 
 
127 Id. at comment following §807. However, if the gestational agreement is not judicially validated, the 
gestational mother is the legal mother. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 9B U.L.A. (AS AMENDED 2002) at 
comment following §809. 
 
128 Alabama, Delaware, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming 
(citations omitted). See CSG Approves Two Uniform Acts as “Suggested State Legislation”, available at 
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemID=213 (last visited Jan. 15, 
2011). The first draft of a “Model Act” has also been published. See Sara Cotton et al., Model Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Act, 9 J. Gender, Race & Just. 55 (2005).  To our knowledge it has not yet been 
reduced to final form or adopted by any state. 
 
129 See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 13, 801-819 (2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-2-401 to -907 (2005). 
 
130 However 38 states have “fetal homicide” statutes; laws that punish people who kill a pregnant women 
and cause the death of her fetus. See Fetal Homicide, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/fethom.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).  Of those, 21 
apply to the earliest stages of pregnancy.  Id.  This indicates that, while such states have not statutorily 
recognized embryos as human beings, embryos are not always property.  On a potentially related note, a 
New York appellate court recently ruled that a boy, in utero when his father was killed, had standing to 
bring a wrongful death action.  See Ashby Jones, Unusual New York Wrongful Death Suit Allowed to Move 
Forward, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/12/09/unusual-new-york-wrongful-death-suit-
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purposes of this article, one aspect is critical. If embryos are “people,” they cannot be 
bought or sold.131 If they are “property,” disposition can be contracted like other 
goods.132 This distinction seems to warrant not just regulation, but a comprehensive and 
consistent body of rules. Unfortunately, developed regulation is sparse and, where it does 
exist, embryos may be people, property, or something in between. 
     Louisiana designates embryos as legal persons,133 while pending Georgia legislation 
declares that embryo life begins at the single-cell stage and that embryos have rights and 
responsibilities under state law.134 New Mexico gives embryos the status of “fetus” by its 
broad statutory definition135 and Missouri law is that “the life of each human being 
begins at conception.”136 At the other end of the continuum Michigan recently passed a 
statute treating some embryos as property137 and Florida law grants sperm and egg 
donors joint decision-making regarding embryo disposition.138 At common law, Texas 
                                                                                                                                  
allowed-to-move-forward/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).  This case also indicates that the un-born have some 
legal rights. 
131 See Paige C. Cunningham, Embryo Adoption or Embryo Donation?: The Distinction and its 
Implications, Center for Bioethics & Human Dignity, Apr. 16, 2003 available at 
http://cbhd.org/content/embryo-adoption-or-embryo-donation-distinction-and-its-implications (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2011). 
 
132 Id. 
 
133 See L.A. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (1986). Interestingly, in the same year that Louisiana enacted this 
law, the United States Supreme Court was clear that it had never implied that an embryo or fetus was a 
human being. See Thornbury v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 779 (1986) 
(“No Member of this Court has ever suggested that a fetus is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court has not re-visited the issue in the quarter-
century since. 
 
134 See Georgia Passes Nation’s First Embryo Adoption Law, available at 
http://www.thevoicemagazine.com/headline-news/headline-news/georgia-passes-nations-first-embryo-
adoption-law.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). The text of the law is available at 
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2009_10/fulltext/hb388.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2010). The Governor 
had not signed the bill at the time this article was drafted. 
 
135 See N.M. STAT. § 24-9A-3 (2008) (the statute defines a “fetus” as “the product of conception from the 
time of conception until the expulsion or extraction of the fetus or the opening of the uterine cavity.”). 
 
136 See § 1.205 R.S.MO. (2010). 
 
137 See Shari Roan, Obama Victory Delights, available at 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/booster_shots/2008/11/obama-victory-d.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2010). 
 
138 See FLA. STAT. § 742.17(2) (2009). 
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treats embryos as property by allowing contract law to determine disposition.139 It 
appears that Maine, Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania statutorily recognize 
a special “interim” status making embryos more than property but less than human140 
and, while Tennessee has not codified such status, its Supreme Court held that “[Embryos 
are] not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property’, but occupy an interim category 
that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life.”141 While 
there is little definitive status regulation, there is even less regarding the sale of human 
embryos. Louisiana142 and Florida143 statutorily prohibit such transactions, while Virginia 
exempts human ovum from its statutory restriction on the sale of human body parts.144  
     It may appear fortunate that more states have surrogacy regulation, at least as 
compared to embryo regulation, but more is not better145 when it lacks consistency. 
Current state regulation primarily addresses two frequently inter-related areas. The first is 
the enforceability of surrogacy agreements themselves. Some states prohibit certain 
                                            
139 See, e.g., Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.2d 40, 49-50 (Tex. App. 2006). But see Jodi L. Bender, Snowflakes 
in Texas? Enacting Legislation to Allow for Embryo Adoption, 16 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 413, 414 (2010) 
(arguing that “But, in recent years, the courts and legislature have gradually moved in the direction of 
giving embryos the legal status of a person.”) The author contends that Texas should adopt an “interim” 
status and “…suggests that Texas enact laws that will place a frozen embryo in a unique category not as a 
person, but as a special kind of property deserving of extraordinary respect.” Id. at 415. 
    The author made that contention in a 2010 article. It does not appear accurate.  In 2007 the Texas House 
of Representatives had the opportunity to address HB 1703.  That Act would have, in pertinent part, 
defined a human embryo as a “a genetically complete living organism of the species Homo [S]apien, from 
the single-cell zygote stage to eight weeks’ development.”  Further, the bill would have defined “embryo 
trafficking” as “…creating a human embryo using in vitro fertilization for the purpose of selling, buying, or 
transferring for valuable consideration the human embryo to a person who is not a genetic parent of the 
embryo or the spouse of the genetic parent.” Id.  See HOUSE COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, 
Tex. H.B. 1703, 8th Leg. R.S. (2007).  The bill apparently expired during session.  See 
http://www.thbi.com/storage/pdf-files/end_of_session_report_80.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).  There is no 
record of similar proposed legislation since.  We are more than a little surprised that this legislation died so 
quietly as it was clearly in response to the formation of the highly controversial Abraham Life Center in 
San Antonio in 2006.  See supra note 55.  
 
140 See Baiman, supra note 112, at 145. 
 
141 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (1992). 
 
142 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (LexisNexis2006). 
 
143 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 
144 See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (LexisNexis 2006).  
 
145 As succinctly summarized by one author, “The law of surrogate motherhood in the United States is in a 
state of flux and confusion.” See Carla Spivack, SECTION IIA: CIVIL LAW: The Law of Surrogate 
Motherhood in the United States, 58 Am. J. Comp. 97, 97 (2010). 
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surrogacy agreements completely,146 some limit agreements,147 while still others 
recognize the enforceability of surrogacy contracts.148 The second area is surrogate 
compensation. The approach here, again, differs. Some states refuse to enforce surrogacy 
agreements if the surrogate receives compensation for her services149 or make only 
altruistic surrogacy legal.150 Other jurisdictions prohibit payment to intermediaries used 
to help provide surrogates,151 thus likely decreasing the number of potential surrogates 
actually available.152 The end result is that, similar to state embryo regulation, state level 
surrogacy regulation varies greatly, in the oft chance it exists at all.153 
 
D. VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS 
 
     Two entities promulgate aspects of voluntary embryo regulation, the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) and a consortium featuring the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine (“ASRM”). The ABA formally adopted its Model Act Governing Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (“Model Act”) in 2008. The Model Act defines an “embryo” 
as “a cell or group of cells containing a diploid complement of chromosomes or groups of 
                                            
146 See State by State Surrogacy Laws, available at http://www.rainbowlaw.com/surrogacy-adoption-and-
ivf/188-state-by-state-surrogacy-laws) (last visited Jan. 3, 2010). Examples include Delaware, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia.  
 
147 Examples include Nevada, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Id. 
 
148 Examples include California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Ohio. Id. For a related 
discussion see Radhika Rao, SURROGACY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: THE OUTCOME OF AMBIVALENCE IN 
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 23 (Rachel Cook, et al. eds., 2003).  
 
149 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (WEST 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713(A) (WEST 
2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (2005); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(1) (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 48-10-102(a) (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.230 (2006).  
 
150 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.212(1)(h) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 168-B:16(IV) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-162(A) (2005).  
 
151 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-218(A) (2006); D.C. CODE § 16-402(b) (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
199.590(4) (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(IV) (2006); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(2)(b) 
(McKinney 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-165(A) (2006). 
 
152 At least one state takes a slightly different approach and regulates issues such as parental status in 
surrogacy relationships. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/1-75 (2006). 
 
153 For further discussion regarding the status of surrogacy laws by state see supra note 146 at 101-102; 
Surrogacy Laws by State, available at http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/surrogacylaws.htm (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2010). 
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such cells (not gamete or gametes) that has the potential to develop into a live-born 
human being if transferred into the body of a woman under conditions in which gestation 
may be reasonably expected to occur.”154 This appears to fall into the “interim” 
classification previously discussed155 as the embryo is not life, but has the potential to 
develop into human life. The Model Act also calls for donation regulation addressing 
such issues as relinquishment of future parental and inheritance rights156 and donor 
screening prior to donation.157 It is unclear if any person or entity adopted the Model Act. 
The ASRM is “…a voluntary, non-profit organization devoted to advancing 
knowledge and expertise in reproductive medicine, including infertility, menopause, 
contraception, and sexuality.”158 It is “…the leading market force in the field of 
reproductive medicine.”159 The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) is 
“…the primary organization of professionals dedicated to the practice of assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART) in the United States.”160 “SART is extensively involved 
in data collection, practice guidelines and standards, government interaction, quality 
assurance, and research.”161 SART is also comprehensively involved with a wide variety 
of entities that have significant ART interests and concerns.162 ASRM and SART, along 
                                            
154 See AM. BAR ASS'N MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(1) (2008), available at 
http://www.abanetorg/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2010).  
 
155 See supra note 140. 
 
156 See supra note 154, at § 102(9). 
 
157 See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. and Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The New American Bar 
Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 Fam. L.Q. 203, 214 (2008). 
 
158 See Welcome to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, available at http://asrm.org/ (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2009). 
 
159 See Reddis-Smalls, supra note 119, at 673.  
 
160 See Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, available at 
http://www.sart.org/detail.aspx?id=1864 (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 
161 See Reddis-Smalls, supra note 119, at 675. 
 
162 See David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted Reproduction Technologies in the United States, 39 Fam. 
L.Q. 727, 735 (2005): 
 
[B]oth SART and ASRM have continued to cooperate with and lead initiatives with other 
organizations and institutions that are stakeholders in ART. These include the CDC, FDA, NIH, 
FTC, and members of Congress as well as professional organizations such as the American 
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with the College of American Pathologists (“COP”) created the Reproductive Laboratory 
Accreditation Program (RLAP).163 That program proffers standards for reproductive 
laboratories and performs on-site accreditation every two years.164 SART represents 85% 
of the clinics practicing ART in the United States165 and as of 2005, two-thirds of SART 
programs were RLAP accredited.166 ASRM appears to adopt an “interim” embryo status 
position, “while an embryo deserves greater respect than accorded other human tissue, 
since it has the potential to become a human person, it is not accorded the respect of an 
actual human being.”167 This standing would seem to dictate heightened standards for 
embryo laboratories, but that is not the case. The RLAP directives do not discuss embryo 
donation or storage specifically and they leave particular procedures to the individual 
facilities.168 This is problematic as fertility clinic’s voluntary procedures vary 
tremendously169 and may not be followed at all.170 While there is very little voluntary 
embryo regulation, there is no voluntary surrogate regulation, other than entity specific 
standards such as screening.171 
                                                                                                                                  
Medical Association (AMA), American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), the 
American Bar Association (ABA) and consumer organizations, RESOLVE, the National Fertility 
Organization, and the American Fertility Association (AFA). 
 
SART even conducts its compliance visits in conjunction with the FDA.  See Reddis-Smalls, supra note 
119, at 674.  
 
163 See Adamson, supra note 162, at 732-33.  
 
164 Id.  
 
165 See supra note 160.  
 
166 Id. 
 
167 See ETHICS COMM. OF THE AM. FERTILITY SOC’Y, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive 
Technologies, 46 Fertility & Sterility 30, (Sept. 1986). 
 
168 Instead of identifying particular processes or procedures, the Standards speak in general terms. See, e.g., 
supra note 160, at 4. “There must be a manual(s) in the laboratory describing all procedures in sufficient 
detail to assure reproductibility and competence in the handling of gametes.”  
 
169 See Alvare, supra note 120, at 12.  
 
170 See CENTER FOR GENETICS AND SCIENCE, Possible Federal Oversight for the New Human 
Biotechnologies, Opportunities for the New Administration, 4, (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/downloads/CGSObama.pdf.  
 
171 See infra notes. 218-19. 
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V. BECOMING OR UTILIZING A “CYBER PARENT”172 
 
A. POTENTIAL PARENTAL RIGHTS 
 
     There are three common classifications of reproductive tissue donors, “known,”173 
“unknown”174 and “identified.”175 Most embryo donorship is unknown as the recipients 
never know the identity of the donor(s).176 When donor identity is unknown the donor 
has no parental rights, so it is unlikely (although not impossible)177 that an embryo donor 
would have parental rights. Surrogates may have a very different legal position. 
     Surrogacy can create very strong ties between the surrogate and the resulting child178 
and disputes can arise over custody. The fundamental question at issue is whether 
                                                                                                                                  
 
172 “A person who provides, online, human reproductive materials he or she biologically produced.” 
 
173 There is not yet any case law on point addressing embryo donorship so we borrow from the well 
established case law regarding sperm donation.  A “known” sperm donor’s identity is known to the 
prospective mother. Courts tend to order child support more often from known donors, regardless of any 
intent of the adult parties.  See, e.g., Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 
2005) (support ordered for child conceived after woman self-inseminated following oral sex); S.F. v. State 
ex rel T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (support ordered for child conceived when father was 
passed out drunk); Faske v. Bonanno, 357 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Mich. App. 1984) (disallowing 
misrepresentation of contraceptive protection as a defense). 
 
174 An “unknown” or “anonymous” sperm donor is one whose identity or other personal contact 
information is undisclosed to either the prospective mother or the child. 
 
175 An “identified” sperm donor donates understanding that any resulting child is given the donor’s personal 
contact information and personal identification (name, address, city of birth, date of birth, etc) once the 
child reaches the age of 18.  
 
176 See, e.g., Rotunda Fertility Clinic's Adoption Policies, available at 
http://iwannagetpregnant.com/embryo.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) (clinic handles embryo “adoption” 
like a closed adoption, with no contact between the parties). 
 
177 However it is possible, particularly in a designer embryo purchase, that the true parent(s) could be 
known as suppliers would likely want aspects of parentage known so as to increase value of the embryo. It 
is also probable that the parent(s) would be known in a donation that involves no embryo supplier, 
although, these are likely to be quite rare. 
 
178 See Sarah Terman, Marketing Motherhood: Rights and Responsibilities of Egg Donors in Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Agreements, 3 N.W. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 167, 169 (2008).  
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surrogates have parental rights over resulting children. The deceptively simple answer is, 
perhaps. Courts currently have very little precedent,179 but a thread may be developing. 
     The most famous surrogate custody case, and certainly the first to garner strong public 
attention, was In the Matter of Baby M.180 Baby M was a traditional surrogacy case. Mary 
Beth Whitehead was artificially inseminated with William Stern's sperm and became the 
surrogate mother of the child.181 Whitehead gave birth to a daughter.182 Within 24-hours 
of transferring custody to the Sterns, Whitehead asked for the baby back and threatened 
suicide.183 She then refused to return the baby to the Sterns and left New Jersey, taking 
the infant with her.184 The New Jersey Superior Court awarded custody of Baby M to the 
Sterns.185  
     On appeal the Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated surrogacy contracts as 
against public policy,186 remanding the case to family court.187 That court awarded 
William Stern custody and Mary Beth Whitehead the parental right of visitation.188 Baby 
M is the most famous189 surrogacy/parental rights case, but it is not dispositive of those 
                                            
179 See Miriam Perez, Surrogacy: The Next Frontier for Reproductive Justice, available at 
http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2010/02/23/surrogacy-next-frontier-reproductive-justice (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2010) (“The precedents set by the rare cases that do go to court make up the body of case law that 
affects the practice of surrogacy nationwide.”) 
 
180 1988 N.J. LEXIS 1. 
 
181 Id. at nn. 11-12. 
 
182 Id. at n. 12. 
 
183 Id. at nn.13-14. 
 
184 Id. at n. 14. 
 
185 Id. at 18-19. 
 
186 Id. at 25.  Recently New Jersey built upon Baby M’s holding in A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., unpublished 
opinion Docket #FD-09-001838-07 (2009) (invalidating a gestational surrogacy contract as it violated 
public policy).  
 
187 1988 N.J. LEXIS 105. 
 
188 See In the Matter of Baby M, 225 N.J. Super. 267 (1988). 
 
189 While it is the most famous, it is not the most extreme in terms of result. In Baby M the surrogate was 
awarded the parental right of visitation, but there is one case where the surrogate was awarded primary 
custody. See Flynn v. Bimber, 2005 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 188.  
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issues in all jurisdictions. In fact, if similar issues arose in another state the result might 
be quite different.190 As examples, Ohio would not invalidate a surrogacy contract under 
the theory that such contracts per se violate public policy191 and Massachusetts has 
invalidated a surrogacy agreement on public policy grounds192 but the articulated 
concerns were different from those in Baby M and that court recognized that a valid 
surrogacy agreement could be created in Massachusetts.193 While the above cases 
focused on public policy, there may be another way to assess the likelihood of surrogate 
parental rights; determine who “mom” really is. 
     Johnson v. Calvert194 arose out of a dispute regarding a surrogacy contract. Mr. 
Johnson’s sperm was mixed with Mrs. Johnson’s eggs and the fertilized eggs were 
implanted in the surrogate.195  Shortly before birth the surrogate threatened to keep the 
child unless she was paid monies she contended due under the agreement.196  Both sides 
sought judicial declaration as the lawful parent(s) of the unborn child.197  The court had 
to choose between the biological parents and the birth mother.  It held that “…she who 
intended to procreate the child – this is, she who intended to bring about the birth of the 
child that she intended to raise as her own – is the natural mother.”198  The end result was 
                                            
190 At least one author argues that surrogacy regulation should be decided exclusively at the state level. See 
Dale Elizabeth Lawrence, Surrogacy in California: Genetic and Gestational Rights, 21 Golden Gate U. L. 
Rev. (1991). 
 
191 See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., et al., 879 N.E.2d 740, 741 (“We conclude, therefore, that Ohio does not have an 
articulated public policy against gestational-surrogacy contracts. Consequently, no public policy is violated 
when a gestational-surrogacy contract is entered into….”)  The court noted that a traditional surrogate 
might “…have a different legal position….” Id. at 742. See also S.N. v. M.B., 2010 Ohio LEXIS 1910 
(finding a gestational surrogacy contract valid and enforceable). 
 
192 See R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998). 
 
193 Id. at 797 (“If no compensation is paid beyond pregnancy-related expenses and if the mother is not 
bound by her consent to the father's custody of the child unless she consents after a suitable period has 
passed following the child's birth, the objections we have identified in this opinion to the enforceability of a 
surrogate's consent to custody would be overcome.”) 
 
194 5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993). 
 
195 Id. at 87. 
 
196 Id. at 88. 
 
197 Id. 
 
198 5 Cal. 4th 84, at 93. 
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that the biological mother got custody, not the surrogate.  So, California law is clear 
about who the true mother is in a surrogacy arrangement.  That should then allow us to 
conclude that a surrogate has no parental rights, at least in California, but that may not be 
true.  
     There is a potentially critical footnote in Johnson, it states “…in a true ‘egg donation’ 
situation, where a woman gestates and gives birth to a child formed from the egg of 
another woman with the intent to raise the child as her own, the birth mother is the 
natural mother under California law (emphasis added).”199 That means that where there 
is no biological link between the “intended” mother and the resulting child, the birth 
mother (the surrogate), is the mother. The surrogate would then have full parental rights. 
This footnote is significant because, while it was not mandatory authority, a New York 
appellate court cited Johnson in McDonald v. McDonald200 and held that the non-
biological mother, in a true egg donation case, was the lawful mother.201 Of course it is 
possible that the surrogate would not have parental rights if she contacted them away, but 
that assumes the applicable state recognizes the validity of surrogacy contracts. That 
assumption should not be made.202 So, does a surrogate have parental rights? Perhaps. 
 
 
B. POTENTIAL PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
                                            
199 Id. at 10. 
 
200 196 A.D.2d 7 (1994). 
 
201 Id. at 12. 
 
202 See supra text acc. notes 147-150 . See also Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are 
Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of Children?, 26 Whittier L. Rev. 429, 445 (2004):  
 
 A survey conducted in December 2000 revealed that approximately eleven states 
expressly permitted gestational agreements by statute or case law. Six states statutorily 
declared such agreements void. Approximately eight states enacted statutes to ban  
gestational agreements that pay compensation to the gestational woman . . . [t]he  
survey further revealed that courts in two states refuse to recognize gestational agreements. 
 
For further discussion and breakdown see Surrogacy Agreements, available at 
http://libguides.law.gsu.edu/content.php?pid=122829&sid=1055848 (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).  See also 
http://www.thesurrogacyexperience.com/surrogates.cfm?sc=23&p=99 (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). 
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     Historically, biological parents had financial responsibilities for their children,203 but 
embryo donors would not want such obligations and likely would not have them under 
common or statutory law. As previously discussed, most embryo donation is anonymous 
because parties contract with fertility clinics to provide them with an embryo; they have 
no contact with the donor and do not know the donor’s identity.204 This makes them 
“unknown” donors. Common law is well settled that unknown tissue donors usually have 
no parental responsibilities, while known donors do.205 Twelve states also statutorily 
address this issue.206 The most common position is that a donor is not a parent of a child 
conceived by means of assisted reproduction.207 Additionally, tissue donors may be able 
to contract away parental responsibilities, although this approach is far from well 
settled.208 Currently embryo donors are not likely to have parental responsibilities; that 
may not be the case for surrogates.209 
     As discussed earlier, a surrogate may have parental rights either due to a biological 
relationship to the resulting child or because the applicable jurisdiction holds that the 
birth mother is the legal mother.210 If she can have parental rights, it is only logical that 
                                            
203 See Child Support Laws State by State, available at http://www.child-support-laws-state-by-
state.com/child-support.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2010). 
 
204 But see supra note 177. 
 
205 See. e.g., Ferguson v. McKiernen, 60 Pa. D. & C. 4th 353, 364 (Pa. C.P. 2002) (stating the general rule: 
“We agree with the defendant that if the use of donors in artificial insemination proceedings is permitted in 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the donor should be protected from [parental] liability to the donee.”)  
 
206 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-102, 8-702 to -703 (Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.11, .13-.14, 
17 (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-122, :124, :126-127, :129-130, :132 (2008); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:13, :15 (LexisNexis 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-20-02, 14-20-60 to -61 (Supp. 
2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.97 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 556 (West 
2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.102, .702-.703, .7031 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 78B-15-102, -702-703 (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156, -158 (Supp. 2008); WASH REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.011, .705, .710 (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-402, -902-903 (2007). 
 
207 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-102, 8-702 to -703 (Supp. 2006).  
 
208 See, e.g., 60 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 355–6 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2002), aff’d, 855 A.2d. 121 (Pa. 2004), aff’d, 581 
Pa. 629, 868 A.2d 378 (Pa. Super. 2005). 
 
209 The opposite may be true as well.  If the UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 9B (as amended 2002) were to be 
adopted, specifically Article 8, prospective parents who entered into non-validated surrogacy agreements, 
and later refused to “adopt” the resulting child, could be responsible for support of the child. See supra note 
100, at ART. 8 GESTATIONAL AGREEMENT, Comment.  
 
210 See supra text accompanying notes 181-203. 
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she would have parental responsibilities. It is possible that she might contract those away 
but, as previously discussed, surrogacy contracts are not enforceable in all 
jurisdictions.211  
 
VI. POTENTIAL LIABILITY 
 
A. THE EMBRYO BUSINESS  
 
1. WARRANTIES 
 
     Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs the sale of goods.212 While 
there is a great deal of discussion of whether or not human reproductive materials should 
be goods,213 we contend, for purposes of this article, that human embryos are goods. The 
                                                                                                                                  
 
211 See supra text accompanying notes 147-150. 
 
212 UCC § 2-102, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/2/article2.htm (last Jan. 16, 2011). 
 
213 As we will discuss, human embryos are legally be bought and sold.  However, the “properness” of such 
transaction is far from settled on an economic theory, ethical, or moral basis.  See, e.g., Kenneth Baum, 
Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 107, 162-63 
(2001) (“The rationales for the prohibition of the commodification of organs are either internally irrational 
or are not applicable to oocyte donation due to its unique technical and social aspects.  Additionally, 
oocyte-specific arguments misconstrue the potential applications of such technology and fail to conform 
with broader social treatments of noncoital reproduction and freedom to contract.”); Gregory Pence, De-
Regulating and De-Criminalizing Innovations in Human Reproduction, 39 Cumb. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2009) 
(“Public intellectuals ... claim that such innovation wrongly commodifies life. I believe that the opposite is 
true: money fueled stupendous breakthroughs in assisted reproduction and such market forces will continue 
to be good for babies and for the infertile couples who want them.”);  Radhika Rao, Coercion, 
Commercialization, and Commodification: The Ethics of Compensation for Egg Donors in Stem Cell 
Research, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1055, 1058 (2006) (“Allowing human eggs to be bought and sold ... treats 
the sacred components of human life as a form of property, engendering an attitude of disrespect for actual 
personn.”); Camille S. Williams, Women, Equality, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 20 BYU J. Pub. 
L. 487, 511 (2006) (“In a sense, these transactional procreative arrangements reduce the missing sex to the 
products of their reproductive abilities: sperm, ova, gestation, labor, and birth, and the ultimate product of 
the transaction, the child, to a commodity.”); see also Matthew H. Baughman, In Search of Common 
Ground: One Pragmatist Perspective on the Debate Over Contract Surrogacy, 10 Colum. J. Gender & L. 
263, 279-80 (2001) (differentiating contracting to sell and purchase renewable reproductive services from 
the concept of selling and purchasing a child); Suriya E.P. Jayanti, Guarantors of Our Genes: Are Egg 
Donors Liable for Latent Genetic Disease?, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 405, 426 (2008) (exploring implications of 
viewing donor eggs as commodities on potential product liability tort actions).  
     Much of the discussion on this topic focuses on whether or not reproductive materials are, or should be, 
“property.” See, e.g., Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 Va. L. Rev. 163, 181-82 (2000) 
(“Whoever has the power to donate (or refuse to donate) the organ can be said to possess a property right, 
albeit it of a limited kind.”); Rao, supra, at 1066 (“Constructing the body as a form of property . . . would 
imply not only freedom from physical invasion, but also freedom to instrumentalize the body by 
technologically manipulating it or otherwise putting it to productive use.”); Andrew Wancata, No Value for 
a Pound of Flesh: Extending Market-Inalienability of the Human Body, 18 J.L. & Health 199, 223 (2004) 
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UCC defines “good[s]” as “all things . . . which are movable at the time of identification 
to the contract for sale . . . .”214 Embryos are transported from place to place215 and 
embryos are sold.216 Embryos are goods and their sale can be governed by the UCC. 
 
a. EXPRESS WARRANTIES 
 
     Pursuant to UCC Article 2, any oral or written promise relating to the good at issue 
can create an express warranty.217 Accordingly, statements that an embryo donor was 
screened for, or is free from, certain diseases or medical conditions can constitute an 
express warranty. Embryo suppliers attempt to distinguish themselves by promoting such 
standards in their web advertising, thus creating express warranties.218 
                                                                                                                                  
(“Legal scholars and property theorists, as well as judges, have found it very difficult to speak of human 
body parts without resorting to masking them in property terminology.”); see generally Elizabeth E. Appel 
Blue, Redefining Stewardship over Body Parts, 21 J.L. & Health 75, 85-95 (2008) (contrasting benefits and 
shortcomings of viewing body parts as property); R. Alta Charo, Skin and Bones: Post-Mortem Markets in 
Human Tissue, 26 Nova L. Rev. 421 424-30 (2002) (examining historical treatments of the market value of 
corpses and human tissue). 
 
214 UCC § 2-105. 
 
215 “Movement” occurs when the embryo is implanted into the uterus.  
 
216 See, e.g., California Conceptions, available at 
http://www.californiaconceptionn.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=69 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2011) 
 
217 U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) “Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates 
to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the affirmation or promise.”  
 
218 See, e.g., supra note 216 (“All donors who choose to anonymously donate through this program are 
thoroughly screened for infectious diseases and meet all state and federal regulation.  Donors that provide 
embryos have also been screened for health risks including inherited disorders, mental illness, and other 
traits that would be undesirable to most parents.”); UCSF Medical Center, available at 
http://coe.ucsf.edu/ivf/embryo_donation_program_for_recipient.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) (“Donors 
are carefully screened by our Embryo Donation Program team. In screening donors, we adhere to the 
guidelines from the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, the United States Food and Drug 
Administration, and to the university’s institutional ethics board.”) 
   Unfortunately, it may be that these promises are regularly broken. One study, though dated, revealed that 
many physicians failed to adequately screen donors for diseases and many screenings were limited to 
merely questioning donors about common familial diseases. See Martin Curie-Cohen et al., Current 
Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300 New Eng. J. Med. 585, 586 (1979). It 
is possible that physicians have engaged in more rigorous screening in intervening years, but there are few 
safeguards to actually ensure such practices. See Kerry Cork, Comment, Test-Tube Parents: Collaborative 
Reproduction in Minnesota, 22 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1535, 1537 (1996).  
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     Some embryo suppliers also specifically warrant attributes or qualifications of donors 
through donor profiles,219 although they may actually warrant more than they expect. 
While suppliers may believe they only promise that a donor has certain characteristics, 
they may actually warrant characteristics of a resulting child. An oral or written promise 
creates an express warranty, but a sample or model also does so when it is “part of the 
basis of the bargain.”220 If a photograph or biography of a donor constitutes a model,221 
the purchaser may expect the resulting child to have the model’s characteristics.222 Most 
reasonable people recognize that a child’s characteristics may differ greatly from those of 
a genetic parent, but it is not well settled that reliance on an express warranty must be 
reasonable.223 Embryo suppliers that fail to meet promised standards of donor screening 
                                            
219 Most profiles and databases are proprietary and cannot be accessed by the general public. See, e.g., 
Miracles Waiting, available at http://miracleswaiting.org/membersonly3/modules/sections/ (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2011).  We expect the embryo market to develop similarly to the human egg market.  We provide 
the following egg examples to give context to what embryo donor advertising is likely to look like.   
   A link to a sample donor profile form is available at http://www.elitefertility.com/egg-donor-profile-
database.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).  For a sense of how many donors may be available see The Egg 
Donor Center, available at http://www.theeggdonor.com/egg_donors.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) (The 
Egg Donor Center Database “…has 6412 prescreened egg donors, 642 interviewed and approved egg 
donors, and 18 currently unavailable egg donors on file….”) For a “menu board” of donor photos see Egg 
Donations, Inc., available at http://www.eggdonor.com/?page=donordb (last visited Jan. 16, 2011). 
 
220 U.C.C. § 2-313(1): 
 
A seller who makes an affirmation of fact or promise relating to the goods or  
who supplies a description, sample or model of the goods that becomes part of  
the basis of the bargain makes an express warranty that the goods will conform  
to that affirmation of fact, promise, description, sample or model.  
 
221 To our knowledge, no court has decided this specific issue. It is impossible to accurately predict how a 
court would likely rule as the UCC provides no guidance for determining what constitutes a model.  
 
222 There is little doubt that reproductive materials sellers want precisely that perception. Sales of athletes’ 
sperms jumped 150% in one month after the athletes were shown as “Donors of the Month” at California 
Cryobank. See E:60 Sperm U, available at http://espn.go.com/video/clip?id=3554822&categoryid=null 
(last visited Jan. 16, 2011). See also  
http://www.cryobank.com/About-us/Press-Releases/template.cfm?id=1396 (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) 
(where customers can shop for donors who look like famous people).  
 
223 For a very comprehensive analysis see James J. White, Freeing the Tortious Soul of Express Warranty 
Law, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 2089, at n. 31 (1998): 
 
 In many states there are cases taking irreconcilable positions regarding whether reliance  
 by the buyer is required for express warranty liability. While some cases from each of the  
 following jurisdictions require reliance, there are others in most of these jurisdictions that  
 grant recovery without explicitly mentioning reliance. See, for example, in Maryland:  
 Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., Civ. A. No. HAR 90-1424, 1992 WL 368062 at 5  
 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 1992) (“The court would have to find that such representations induced  
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 the Worms to purchase Scepter... Because the literature upon which the plaintiffs  
 rely did not exist in 1987 and plaintiffs therefore could not have relied on it ... it did  
 not become part of the basis of the bargain.”); Illinois: Stamm v. Wilder Travel  
 Trailers, 358 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (“Cases under the present day  
 Commercial Code ... require a reliance by the buyer upon the promise, affirmation  
 or description.”); cf. Adolphson v. Gardner-Denver Co., 553 N.E.2d 793, 798  
 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (“The trial court was not obligated to accept the plaintiff's  
 argument that the sales brochure created an express warranty ... given the fact  
 that Adolphson testified that he did not rely on the sales brochure....”); but see  
 Weng v. Allison, 678 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 (Ill. App. 1997) (citation omitted) (“The  
 trial court's ruling that the statements of the seller could not have been part of the  
 basis of the bargain simply because no reasonable persons could have relied upon  
 those statements was erroneous. The trial court misconstrued the role of reliance  
 in determining whether an affirmation of fact or description is part of the basis of  
 the bargain. Affirmations of fact made during the bargain are presumed to be part  
 of the basis of the bargain unless clear, affirmative proof otherwise is shown ... It is  
 not necessary, therefore, for the buyer to show reasonable reliance upon the seller's  
 affirmation....”); New York: Scaringe v. Holstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (N.Y.  
 App. Div. 1984) (citation omitted) (“A necessary element in the creation of an  
 express warranty is the buyer's reliance upon the seller's affirmations or promises.”);  
 Pilch, Inc. v. L & L Started Pullets, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 6513 (CSH), 1987 WL 9430,  
 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1987) (citation omitted) (“In order to succeed on an express  
 warranty theory under [2-313], it is necessary for the purchaser to plead and prove  
 that the written promotional literature in question was furnished to buyer prior to  
 the purchase, and relied upon him [sic] in making the purchase.”); Shapiro Budrow  
 & Assocs., Inc. v. Microdata Corp., No. 84 Civ. 3589 (CBM), 1986 WL 2756, at *7  
 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1986) (quoting Eddington v. Dick, 386 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181 (City  
 Court, Geneva County, 1976)) (“In order to make out a cause of action for breach of  
 express warranty, the buyer must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, 1)  
 an affirmation of fact or promise by the seller; 2) the natural tendency of the said  
 affirmation or promise was to induce the buyer to purchase goods; 3) that the buyer  
 purchased goods in reliance thereon....'“); cf. Tecnoclima, S.p.A. v. PJC Group of New  
 York, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 4437 (CSH), 1993 WL 404109, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1993)  
 (“The finder of fact could determine that Circle relied on the specifications in assessing  
 the marketability of the boiler/burner combination. Such a finding would support a  
 claim for breach of express warranty.”); but see CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ'g Co., 553  
 N.E.2d 997, 1001 (N.Y. 1990) (citation omitted) (“This view of “reliance' – i.e., as  
 requiring no more than reliance on the express warranty as being a part of the bargain  
 between the parties – reflects the prevailing perception of an action for breach of express  
 warranty as one that is no longer grounded in tort, but essentially in contract. The  
 express warranty is as much a part of the contract as any other term. Once the express  
 warranty is shown to have been relied on as part of the contract, the right [to damages]  
 for its breach does not depend on proof that the buyer thereafter believed that the  
 assurances of fact made in the warranty would be fulfilled.”); Rogath v. Siebenmann,  
 129 F.3d 261, 264 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Galli v. Metz, 973 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir.  
 1992) (emphasis in original) (““Where a buyer closes on a contract in the full  
 knowledge and acceptance of facts disclosed by the seller which would constitute a  
 breach of warranty under the terms of the contract, the buyer should be foreclosed from  
 later asserting the breach ... unless the buyer expressly preserves his rights under the  
 warranties ... On the other hand, if the seller is not the source of the buyer's knowledge,  
 e.g., if it is merely “common knowledge” that the facts warranted are false ..., the buyer  
 may prevail in his claim for breach of warranty'“); Massachusetts: Sprague v. Upjohn Co.,  
 Civ. A. No. 91-40035-NMG, 1995 WL 376934, 3 (D. Mass. May 10, 1994) (citation  
 omitted) (“In an express warranty claim, plaintiff must show reliance on such warranty.”);  
 Stuto v. Corning Glass Works, Civ. A. No. 88-1150-WF, 1990 WL 105615, 5 (D. Mass.  
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would certainly be liable for breaching expressed warranties. Suppliers making a promise 
of resulting characteristics through a model, and failing to deliver those characteristics, 
may also be liable for such breach. 
 
b. MERCHANTABILITY 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 July 23, 1990) (“This court believes that some minimum of reliance is a required element 
  of a breach of express warranty claim....”); cf. Roth v. Bay-Stel's Hair Stylists, Inc.,  
 470 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. App. 1984) (noting that “the hairdresser testified that he had  
 read the information printed on the box, and, relying on it, he recommended its use to  
 Judith Roth”); Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 611, 617  
 (Mass. 1982) (noting that “the trial judge found that Hannon relied on Aquatech's  
 brochure”); Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co., 149 N.E.2d 635, 637 (Mass. 1958)  
 (noting that “Mrs. Jacquot ... relied upon these express warranties”); but see Wechsler v.  
 Long Island Rehabilitation Ctr. of Nassau, Inc., No. Civ. A. 93-6946-13, 1996 WL  
 590679, at 22 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 1996) (“The trustee is not required to establish  
 that in connection with a specific account receivable it purchased, Towers relied on the  
 factual truth of each of the representations and warranties; what must be shown is that  
 Towers relied on the fact of the warranties, that is, the promise itself that the  
 representations and warranties were true....”); Kentucky: Overstreet v. Norden Lab., Inc.,  
 669 F.2d 1286, 1291 (6th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted) (“A warranty is the basis of the  
 bargain if it has been relied upon as one of the inducements for purchasing the product.”);  
 Nebraska: Vlasin v. Shuey, No. A-91-324, 1993 WL 61875, 1 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 9,  
 1994) (“Nebraska case law has long held that the assertion of a fact or promise by a seller  
 concerning goods, which is relied upon by the buyer and which tends to induce the buyer  
to purchase the goods, is an express warranty.”); Hillcrest Country Club v. N.D. Judds  
Co., 461 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Neb. 1990) (citation omitted) (“This court has held that “since  
an express warranty must have been “made part of the basis of the bargain,” it is essential  
that the plaintiffs prove reliance upon the warranty.'“); Wendt v. Beardmore Suburban  
Chevrolet, Inc., 366 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Neb. 1985) (citation omitted) (“Since an express  
warranty must have been “made part of the basis of the bargain,' it is essential that the  
plaintiffs prove reliance upon the warranty.”); Indiana: Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. v.  
Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 44 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted) (“The requirement  
that a statement be part of the basis of the bargain in order to constitute an express  
warranty “is essentially a reliance requirement....'“); Kansas: Ray Martin Painting, Inc.  
v. Ameron, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 768, 772 (D. Kan. 1986) (citation omitted) (“Whether the  
statements about the coating ability of the Amerlock created an express warranty depends  
on whether they were “part of the basis of the bargain' which, under Kansas law, requires  
some type of reliance on the part of the buyer.”); Mississippi: Global Truck & Equip. Co.,  
Inc. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641, 652 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (“Given the  
express language used in U.C.C. section 2-313 and the majority of the cases holding that  
the buyer must both be knowledgeable of and rely on the affirmation of fact before an  
express warranty is created, the court concludes that the plaintiff failed to prove by a  
preponderance of the evidence that the statements contained in the Palmer brochure were  
relied upon by Randall prior to or contemporaneously with the making of the contract  
between Global and Palmer.  Therefore, recovery under the theory of breach of express  
warranty is also precluded.”);  Washington: Casper v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,  
806 F. Supp. 903, 909 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (citation omitted) (“If, in fact, Mr. Warr assured  
Brad Casper that Velpar could be applied safely during November or December of 1990,  
and Mr. Casper relied upon that affirmation of fact in deciding to have PureGro treat his  
fields, an express warranty was created.”). 
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     “Unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is 
[automatically] implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect 
to goods of that kind.”224 “Merchantable” means the goods “are fit for the ordinary 
purposes for which [they] are used.”225 The U.C.C. defines a merchant as:  
A person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation  
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or  
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be 
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who  
by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.226  
 
     Most embryo suppliers are merchants, for purposes of the U.C.C., pursuant to the 
“deals in” definition, and quite probably under “knowledge and skill” as well. Most 
embryo donors probably are not merchants under “knowledge and skill,”227 but might be 
under the “deals in” standard.228 
     Embryo donors and suppliers have little to fear when it comes to the issue of breach of 
warranty of merchantability because this warranty only requires that embryos be 
“reasonably fit” for their ordinary use (attempted conception). The warranty does not 
guarantee a resulting child, much less one with specific characteristics. Absent extreme 
circumstances229 it is unlikely that donors or suppliers would breach this warranty.230 
                                            
224 U.C.C. § 2-104(1). 
 
225 Id. at § 2-314(2)(c). 
 
226 Id. at § 2-104(1). 
 
227 For an analogy, see Jayanti supra note 213, at 433 (“[T]he egg [donor] is usually less knowledgeable 
than the ‘consumer’, the recipient parents.”)  
 
228 One author flatly contends that human tissue donors are “…not often ‘engaged in the business’ of 
selling or otherwise distributing [tissue]” and cannot be merchants under the U.C.C.. See Id. at 432. 
However, the question of whether a party is a merchant for purposes of the U.C.C. is a question of law. See, 
e.g., County of Milwaukee v. Northrop Data Systems. Inc., 602 F.2d 767 (7th Cir.1979). As such 
determination must be made on a case by case basis, we cannot say that all embryo donors are merchants 
and subject to the U.C.C.. Certainly some may be and it is likely that most, if not all, egg suppliers are 
merchants for purposes of the U.C.C. as well. 
 
229 Obvious examples are providing embryos damaged during collection, storage, or transportation such 
that they cannot be gestated. 
 
230 While rare, embryo donors and suppliers are protected by statute in some jurisdictions from this cause of 
action and the one discussed next. As an example, South Carolina has a statute that states “The implied 
warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to a contract for the sale, procurement, 
processing, distribution, or use of human tissues . . . .” See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-43-10 (2005). As 
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c. FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 
 
     An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose exists “where the seller at the 
time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are 
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish 
suitable goods.”231 Responsible embryo donors and suppliers presently have little to fear 
from this warranty because embryos satisfy only the general purpose of attempted 
procreation, not any promise of characteristics in a resulting child. ART has not yet 
advanced to the point where we can control specific aspects of reproduction.232 However 
ART is evolving rapidly and, if the time comes when we can control those types of 
characteristics, then donors and suppliers must be aware that asking prospective 
recipients to designate a donor’s personal characteristics can create a warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose. A prospective client could view such questions as a “checklist” 
for the desired characteristics of the resulting child. They could then view such items as 
akin to a menu and they would expect to get what they ordered. Human tissue suppliers 
currently ask recipients for certain designations but, for now, they remain attempts to 
discern preferences, not actionable promises.233  
 
2. STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY 
 
                                                                                                                                  
previously discussed, the FDA classifies human embryos as reproductive tissue. See supra text 
accompanying note 115. 
 
231 U.C.C. § 2-315. 
 
232 As examples, it cannot yet control characteristics such as height, eye color, intelligence, or athleticism. 
 
233 This is a different conclusion than reached under breach of express warranty because it is a different 
cause of action. The seller creates an express warranty, but a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is 
actually created by the buyer, when he or she causes a seller to know that the buyer is relying on the seller’s 
expertise in making a purchase decision. See text accompanying note 231.  Admittedly it is an assumption, 
but we assume that an embryo donor or supplier (seller) who is aware that a would-be donee (buyer) is 
relying on their expertise, would inform the would-be donee that there is no guarantee that a child will have 
the characteristics of the donor.  We also understand that a donor or supplier may know of a donee’s 
particular purpose (donee said that she wants an embryo that used eggs from a 5’4”, 115 lb., brown-haired, 
blue-eyed world class cyclist because donee wants a child that will grow up to be a 5’4”, 115 lb., brown-
haired, blue-eyed world class cyclist) but might not inform the donee that a child conceived using eggs 
from this donor may not have these characteristics. In that case there is a breach of warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose. 
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     The rational for the tort of strict product liability is simple; products can cause harm or 
injury to users and manufacturers, sellers, and distributors should absorb the cost of these 
injuries rather than end-users.234 Strict product liability has specific elements that an 
injured party must satisfy to recover. While these elements are addressed collectively and 
separately, all discussions encompass the following: 
 
1. There must be a product235 that causes an injury. The product must be sold in the 
same condition, or substantially the same condition, as when reaching the 
consumer or user.236  
 
2. The product must contain a defect and the defective condition must make the 
product “unreasonably dangerous.”237 “Unreasonably dangerous” is “…dangerous 
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer 
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to 
its characteristics.”238 There are three potential types of defects: manufacturing, 
design, and warning.239 
                                            
234 See Seldon J. Childers, Don’t Stop the Music: No Strict Products Liability for Embedded Software, 19 
U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 125, 134 (2008): 
 
The rationales for imposing strict liability for commercial products take two forms. 
The first is a set of moral arguments, based on fairness, positing that manufacturers  
are ethically responsible to innocent consumers who have been harmed because  
the consumers had a reasonable expectation that the manufacturer would supply a  
safe product. The second group of rationales is based on economic arguments or efficiency. For 
example, it is argued that manufacturers are best able to insure  
against losses and to spread the cost of such insurance among all the consumers  
who purchase their products, and that strict liability creates socially desirable  
economic incentives for manufacturers to produce safer products.  
 
235 Courts define “product” very broadly. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 
7.03[1] (4th ed. 1990). 
 
236 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 
237 Id. at § 402A(1) (“One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate 
user or consumer, or to his property….”) 
 
238 Id. at § 402((A), cmt. i. 
 
239 See generally William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 639 (1991). 
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3. Finally, the plaintiff must prove actual injury caused by the product. An injury is 
actual harm or loss to the party’s person, land, or chattel.240  
 
     There is no question that reproductive tissue can cause damage to a recipient, resulting 
fetus, or resulting child,241 but this does not automatically mean that strict product 
liability is a viable cause of action in such situations. In order to assess potential liability 
under this doctrine we must determine if the requisite elements can be satisfied. While no 
case has decided this issue, one can provide a partial template for analysis. 
     American Economy Insurance v. Schoolcraft242 contained a variety of strict product 
liability derivative claims243 In that case one of the plaintiffs was implanted with embryos 
that carried the cystic fibrosis gene. She gave birth to fraternal twins. The daughter was 
quickly diagnosed with the disease.244 American Economy did not address the merits of 
any of its strict product liability causes of action, so we begin by addressing a question it 
did not: are embryos “products?”  
     A product is defined as “something produced by human or mechanical effort or by a 
natural process.245 It is also a “commodit[y] for sale.”246 Embryos are created by a natural 
process in the female body and can be sold to prospective parents. Embryos are products. 
     The second element is that the embryo had a defect that made it unreasonably 
dangerous. A product is defective when it is dangerous beyond the expectations of an 
                                                                                                                                  
 
240 See FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, 1-8 PRODUCTS LIABILITY 8.01[4] (2004).  
 
241 See, e.g., Laurence Mascola & Mary E. Guinan, Screening to Reduce Transmission of Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases in Semen Used for Artificial Insemination, 314 New Eng. J. Med. 1354, 1354 (1986) 
(“[S]exually transmitted organisms have been transmitted during artificial insemination by donor, and such 
transmission can cause . . . disease in the recipient woman and may harm the fetus or newborn.”)  
 
242 551 F.Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2007). 
 
243 Id. at 1237. 
 
244 Id. 
 
245 See http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/product (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).  
 
246 See Wordnet Search, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (search 
“product”). 
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ordinary user.247 If an ordinary user would not expect an embryo to carry a strong 
predisposition toward a specific disease, in this case cystic fibrosis, the embryo is 
defective.  
     Finally, there must be an actual injury or loss to person or property caused by the 
defective embryo. At a minimum, a child who is born with cystic fibrosis has 
experienced, and will experience, several legally recognized and compensable injuries: 
she has been damaged in her enjoyment of life, suffered and will suffer physical and 
mental pain, endured past medical expenses, and is very likely to incur future medical 
expenses. The end result of this analysis is that human embryos can be products that have 
defects resulting in injury and triggering strict product liability. Embryo donors and 
suppliers have significant reason to fear this cause of action.248 
 
3. NEGLIGENCE 
 
     Claimants have alleged negligence in holding facilities’ methods storage and 
dissemination of human reproductive materials. These suits involved two different 
contentions. In the first, the claimant wanted reproductive materials stored and distributed 
to a specified recipient, but the facility failed.249 For purposes of this article, we term 
these “lost embryo” cases because, even if the embryo was used for conception, it did not 
reach the intended recipient. In the second, a child was born with a birth defect 
attributable to an embryo that should have been removed through adequate screening or 
testing. We term these “defective embryo” cases. 
 
a. LOST MATERIALS AND WRONGFUL BIRTH 
                                            
247 See supra text accompanying notes 236-37. 
 
248 One author would likely disagree with this conclusion and presents a number of possible defenses. See 
Jayanti, supra note 213, at 432-35. She appears to be alone in this contention and, as previously discussed, 
we find her logic repeatedly flawed. See J. Brad Reich and Dawn R. Swink, You Can’t Put the Genie Back 
in the Bottle: Potential Rights and Obligations of Egg Donors in the Cyberprocreation Era, 20 Alb. L.J. 
Sci. & Tech. 1, 302-315 (2010). 
 
249 See, e.g., Stanton v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sciences Ctr., 997 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App. 1998); Harnicher v. 
Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 68 (Utah 1998); see also Dorinda Elliot & Friso Endt, Twins – with 
Two Fathers: A Fertility Clinic's Startling Error, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1995, at 38; Barbara Kantrowitz & 
David Kaplan, Not the Right Father, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 19, 1990, at 50; Michael Lasalandra, Woman, Ex 
and Hospital Settle over Sperm Mixup, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 27, 1998, at 12. 
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     There are a number of reported embryos cases.250 According to one source, such 
accidents are exceedingly rare,251 but perhaps not as rare as he espouses. In fact, they 
might happen with disturbing regularity.252 We contend that lost materials cases will 
become even more common as people increasingly utilize forms of ART, but are 
claimants likely to recover under a negligence theory? We must review the traditional 
elements of that cause of action: duty, breach, proximate causation, and harm253 to 
determine potential liability. 
     It is easy to envision victims in lost embryo situations suing both the medical 
professionals involved and the storage entity (such as a fertility clinic), however there is 
one initial, and critical, difference. While medical professionals’ duties are well 
established,254 the legal duty of storage entities is not.255 This uncertainty is the direct 
                                            
250 See, e.g., Fertility Clinic to Couple: You Got the Wrong Embryos, WIBW NEWS, Sept. 23, 2009, 
available at  
http://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/60765137.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2010); 
Quincy Couple Sue Boston Hospital Over Destroyed Embryos, WICKED LOCAL QUINCY NEWS, May 21, 
2009, available at http://www.wickedlocal.com/quincy/news/police_and_fire/x1125039411/Quincy-
couple-sue-Boston-hospital-over-destroyed-embryos) (last visited Dec. 30, 2010); Creed v. United Hosp., 
600 N.Y.S.2d 151 (App. Div. 1993); Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 282 A.2d 231 (N.Y. App. 2001); Robert B. 
and Denise B. v. Susan B., 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 873. See also Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona, 121 P.3d 
1256, 1260 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (the central claim of the case was negligent destruction or loss of pre-
implantation embryos, the claimants were very concerned that the missing embryos may have been 
mistakenly implanted in another woman).  
 
251 See Fertility Clinic to Couple: You Got the Wrong Embryos, id.  “Cases like these, while tragic, are 
exceedingly rare, said Dr. David Adamson, a reproductive endocrinologist and past president of the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM).” “There are well in excess of 100,000 embryo 
transfers every year in this country,’ said Adamson, ‘The fact that this happens once in several hundred 
thousand embryo transfers means the majority of the time, systems do protect this from taking place.’” Id.  
This is suspect because the “systems” the Doctor appears to refer to are ASRM protocol recommendations 
such as labeling embryos with the patient’s name and/or social security number or otherwise specifically 
identifying ownership. Id.  However, these are recommendations only and, as previously discussed (see 
supra text accompanying notes167-71), there is no mandated quality control. 
 
252 A representative of the United Kingdom IVF clinics estimates that one in one thousand IVF embryos are 
implanted into the wrong woman. See Lois Rogers, Women Given Wrong Embryos at IVF Clinics, SUNDAY 
TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 12, 2000, at 4. For a comprehensive history of ART “mix-up” cases and events, see 
Leslie Bender, “To Err is Human” ART Mix-ups: A Labor-Based, Relationship Proposal, 9 J. Gender Race 
& Just. 443, 446–53 (2006). 
 
253 See Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Center, 2003 Ky, LEXIS 178 at 11-12. 
 
254 For example, in New York, a physician has a duty to use reasonable care and exercise the degree of skill 
and knowledge that is ordinarily possessed by physicians in the community. See Pepe v. United States, 599 
F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (N.Y. 1898); and Zellar v. 
Tompkins Community Hosp., 508 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (App. Div. 1986). 
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result of a lack of laws governing the embryo industry. As previously discussed there is 
little federal regulation addressing embryo donor storage256 and we are not aware of any 
at the state level. Statutes can create legal duties, but statutory regulation is almost non-
existent, so we cannot say there is any truly established duty. Without a clearly defined 
duty, it is very difficult to prove a resulting breach. 
     Unlike duty and breach, proximate cause in lost embryo cases is easily established. 
When embryos did not reach the intended recipient, and additional materials are not 
available from that donor, the contention is that but for defendant’s failure to provide the 
appropriate embryos to the appropriate recipient, conception from that particular donor 
would have been possible.  In the case where embryos were provided to the wrong 
recipient, and conception resulted, the contention is that but for the defendant’s failure to 
provide the embryos to the intended recipient, the resulting child would not exist. 
     Harm is highly problematic in lost embryo cases because a court must determine 
whether a) a party has suffered actual damage and, if so b) how to calculate such damage.  
As discussed under causation, lost embryo damages could arise in two different 
scenarios.  The first is where the opportunity to procreate using a specific donor is simply 
gone because embryos were lost and the donor cannot produce more.  There are two 
cases on point here. In Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co. stored embryos were 
contaminated and rendered unusable.257  In Frisina v. Women and Infants Hosp. of R.I, 
the hospital lost or destroyed stored embryos.258  The court denied recovery in Doe 
because the donors could not establish the requisite physical injury,259 but the Frisina 
court allowed recovery based on emotional distress absent physical trauma.260  While this 
is, admittedly, a very small sample of cases, it appears that the majority of jurisdictions 
                                                                                                                                  
 
255 But see Jaynti, supra note 213, at 441 (arguing that a duty could be recognized under a “risk imports 
relation” theory). There are no cases of record finding such a duty. 
 
256 See supra text accompanying notes117-20. 
 
257 7 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
 
258 2002 WL 1288784 (R.I. Super. 2002). 
 
259 7 F. Supp. 2d at 741. 
 
260 2002 WL 1288784 at 10. 
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would follow the Doe rationale because most jurisdictions deny recovery absent physical 
injury.261  Assuming this is correct, it is unlikely that defendants will be found liable 
when stored embryos are lost. 
     In the second lost embryo scenario a recipient received, and utilized, materials from 
someone other than the anticipated donor, resulting in the birth of a healthy baby.  At 
least one author has been highly critical of the basis for damages under such 
circumstances.262 And, while the suit did not assert a negligence cause of action, at least 
one court held that a couple whose healthy child was conceived using lost embryos was 
not entitled to recovery.263 This decision is not surprising when this lost embryo claim is 
juxtaposed with the “wrongful birth” cause of action.  
     Wrongful birth actions are brought by the parents of an impaired child for the 
emotional and financial damages they suffer from the birth of that child.264  At least one 
author contends that wrongful birth cases have some judicial support and acceptance.265 
                                            
261 See generally Ingrid H. Heide, Negligence in the Creation of Healthy Babies: Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress in Cases of Alternative Reproductive Technology Malpractice without Physical Injury, 
9 J. Med. & L. 55 (2005).  However, a claimant may recover for loss of property in such claims and 
physical injury would not be required.  See Jeter, supra note 250, at 1273) (“While a party cannot bring a 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based merely on the negligent destruction of property, a 
party can recover damages for emotional distress arising from the tortious loss of property if the emotional 
distress is unrelated to the pecuniary loss.”); Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at 37 (“[T]he Court finds…that 
recovery for damages for emotional distress based on the “loss of irreplaceable property’, the loss of their 
pre-embryos, is permissible….”) Id. 
 
262 See generally Raizel Liebler, Are You My Parent? Are You My Child? The Role of Genetics and Race in 
Defining Relationships after Reproductive Technological Mistakes, 5 DePaul J. Health Care L. 15 (2002). 
 
263 See Chris Snow, Note, Harnicher v. University of Utah Medical Center: Fertility Treatment and the 
Duty of Care, 2 J. L. Fam. Stud. 63 (2000) (addressing the tort of “negligent infliction of emotional harm” 
and denying recovery as plaintiffs could not prove the requisite element of resulting “bodily harm” as part 
of their injury and damage).  But see Chambliss v. Health Sci. Found., 626 S.E.2d 791 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2006) (A North Carolina jury awarded $85,000 in compensatory damages and $350,000 in punitive 
damages to a woman who was inseminated with lost materials, although the cause of action and the jury 
finding regarding bodily injury are unclear in the appellate opinion.). 
 
264 See Timothy J. Dawe, Note, Wrongful Life: Time for a “Day in Court”, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 473, 476 
(1990). 
 
265 See Megan D. McIntyre, The Potential for Products Liability Actions When Artificial Insemination by 
an Anonymous Donor Produces Children with Genetic Defects, 98 Dick. L. Rev. 519, 539-40 (1993):  
 
 The child's mother would have a better chance of recovering if she brings a  
products liability claim in her own right, seeking damages based on a wrongful  
birth theory. The wrongful birth claim enjoys far greater judicial acceptance  
than wrongful life because it does not define the wrong as the child being given  
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If true, this could increase the likelihood that damages are awarded in lost embryo cases 
because, at base, both wrongful birth and lost materials actions seek damages for birth of 
a child.  However there are two significant differences in the claims that make it unlikely 
that such damages would be awarded in lost embryo cases.  First, in a wrongful birth 
claim the child is impaired,266 in a lost embryo case the child is not.  Second, the 
assertion that wrongful birth is judicially acceptable is true, but far from universal.267  
There are few recorded wrongful birth decisions,268 and none since the 1980s.269  Some 
state courts refuse to recognize wrongful birth causes of action absent statutory 
creation.270  Some state legislatures have passed laws refusing to recognize wrongful 
birth causes of action.271  Only one state, Maine, statutorily recognizes wrongful birth, 
and then only for a limited cause of action.272  Even where wrongful birth exists, a highly 
pragmatic consideration exists when it comes to assessing damage because “[j]uries 
                                                                                                                                  
life, but rather as the denial of the mother's right to choose to abort or to never even  
initiate the pregnancy. Thus, if the mother can show that she would not have  
carried the child to term or that she would not have consented to the  
insemination if she had known the truth about the sperm donor's medical history,  
many courts may award her compensation for wrongful birth. 
 
266 Wrongful Birth damages are predicated on the existence of a congenital defect. See, e.g., Hall v. 
Dartmouth Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 899 A.2d 249, 245 (N.H. 2006). 
 
267 As of 2005, more than half of all United States jurisdictions recognized Wrongful Birth. See Wendy F. 
Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 
141, 160 (2005). 
 
268 See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz/Park v. Chessin, 46 
N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); 
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis.2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975); and Moores v. Lucas, 405 So.2d 
1022 (1981); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315, 319, 322 (Idaho 1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran 
Gen. Hosp., 1987 Ill. LEXIS 208. 
 
269 The most recent decision we are aware of is Gallagher v. Duke University, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 
10022.  
 
270 See, e.g., Etkind v. Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210 (Ga. 1999); Campbell v. United States, 1992 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 13381. 
 
271 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 145.424(2) (1997). 
 
272 See ME. REV. STATE. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (West 1997). 
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would have an extremely difficult time trying to calculate how much the life of a disabled 
child is worth.”273  
If it is difficult for a jury to calculate damages to parents based on birth of a 
disabled child, it is even more difficult to calculate damages to parents for the birth of a 
healthy child. Finally, this type of claim seeks damages for birth and subsequent child 
rearing expenses. Such damages are seldom awarded.274 Claimants likely cannot succeed 
in lost materials cases because, regardless of which scenario their claim falls under, they 
cannot satisfy the requisite elements.275 
 
 b. DEFECTIVE EMBRYOS AND WRONGFUL LIFE 
 
Defective reproductive materials can cause children born with defects. The 
questions addressed in this subsection are whether the parents, and/or the child, can 
recover damages for such an existence.  
 
i. TRADITIONAL NEGLIGENCE 
 
     The elements of duty and breach raise the same concerns previously discussed;276 
because specific legal duties are largely uncertain, resulting breach is difficult to prove. 
                                            
273 See Monique Ann-Marie Croon, Note, Taylor v. Kurapati: The Court of Appeals of Michigan’s Decision 
of Refusing to Recognize the Tort of Wrongful Birth, 5 DePaul J. Health Care L. 317, 339 (2002). But see 
Grubbs, supra note 253 at 21 (“[S]uccessful plaintiffs in wrongful birth actions have received various types 
of damages ranging from the expenses resulting from the impairment but not the normal costs of raising the 
child, to the entire cost of raising the child with no reduction for the cost of raising a healthy child, to only 
the parents' own suffering and mental anguish resulting from the child's birth but not the expense of raising 
the child.”) That case did not cite other decisions in support of this contention. See also Siemienic, supra 
note 268 at 50-51 (asserting that the majority of jurisdictions limit recovery to “extraordinary expenses” – 
or those costs which are necessary to treat the disorder).  
 
274 See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. Hosp., 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1376 (Ohio 1989) (“Another rationale is that the 
cost of child-rearing would be too speculative to measure with any certainty.”). 
 
275 There is a third possible scenario under this subsection and it combines the two lost materials scenarios 
discussed.  Material could be lost and delivered to an incorrect recipient, who then uses it to conceive a 
child who is impaired.  We could not find any record of this occurring, and we have no sense of how 
common this scenario might be, but we have to assume it could happen.  If it did occur, it would suffer the 
same fate as the other lost materials scenarios and for many of the same reason.  First, any legal duty is 
uncertain.  Second, that uncertainty makes proving breach difficult or impossible.  Third, proximate 
causation may be extremely difficult to establish because birth defects may be caused by many sources.  
Finally, it is extremely difficult for juries to value the harm created by the birth of an impaired child.  
 
276 But see Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical 
Innovation, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 603, 638-39 (2003) (“…courts may well conclude that fertility doctors and 
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Perhaps more significantly, proximate causation is problematic. Pursuant to that element, 
a claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, there is a direct causal link 
between the materials provided and the resulting condition. Such a tie is extremely 
difficult to establish because “the majority of genetic and nongenetic birth defects occur 
as the result of spontaneous mutations such that causation cannot be attributed to either 
biological parent.”277 If the claimant can establish causation, damages for harm should be 
much more readily available than in a lost materials case and should encompass 
“economic damages of raising [a] disabled child over and above the ordinary child-
bearing expenses.”278  Additionally, depending on the conduct of the defendant, 
compensatory damages could provide the basis for punitive damages in defective 
materials cases.279  However, much like lost embryo cases, claimants asserting this cause 
of action are unlikely to succeed due to their inability to satisfy the elements.  It does not 
appear that embryo donors or suppliers currently have much to fear from this claim.280 
 
c. WRONGFUL LIFE CLAIMS 
 
     Wrongful Life is a specific claim under the general umbrella of negligence. It is made 
by, or on behalf of, an impaired child asserting that the he or she would have been spared 
                                                                                                                                  
clinics have a duty of care running to the class of intended offspring.”) This is a potentially significant 
development, and a discussion that could shape much regarding this cause of action, but the author does not 
propose what that duty is or should be and none of the cases the he cites in support of this contention 
involve lost materials. 
 
277 See supra note 265, at 537.  
 
278 Schirmer v. Mt. Aubrun Obstetrics & Gynecological Ass’n., 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6471 at 1. 
 
279 See, e.g., Paretta v. Medical Offices for Human Reproduction., 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 321 at 20. 
However, punitive damage recovery may not be possible is some jurisdictions, especially if embryo 
suppliers are treated as some sperm banks have been. See Kenneth Ofgang, Sperm Bank Protected as 
“Health Care Provider,” Court Rules, METROPOLITAN NEWS CO., Sept. 3, 2002, at 1 (“A sperm bank is a 
‘health care provider,’ entitled to special statutory protection from punitive damage claims.”). 
 
280 It is also possible that the holding facility could assert a “state of the art” defense, admitting it had a duty 
to act reasonably and did so, but alleging that medical technology existing at the time of the donation and 
transfer was not sufficient to reveal any pre-existing defect in the reproductive material.  See McIntyre, 
supra note 277, at 544. (“The state-of-the-art defense is properly invoked only if there was no 
technologically feasible way of discovering the defect in the [material].  In these particular cases, the state-
of-the-art defense acts as an absolute bar to negligence.”) Id. The viability of this defense then depends on 
the type of defect and the technology available at the time of donation and transfer. 
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impaired existence, either through parental choice not to conceive or through an abortion, 
were it not for the negligence of a defendant.281  
     Wrongful life has the same elements previously discussed under negligence; duty 
breach, proximate causation and harm. The first three elements continue to suffer the 
same deficiencies. The legal duties are uncertain,282 making breach difficult to prove,283 
and proximate causation remains difficult to establish. Only three states currently 
recognize a cause of action for wrongful life284 and several refused to do so, either by 
statute285 or common law.286 This lack of acceptance is, at least partially, a product of the 
courts’ inability to address the legal issue of harm, separate from a moral or societal 
issue: 
In wrongful life claims…the child usually asserts as “general” damages the  
pain and suffering he will endure during his lifetime as a result of the defect,  
but presumably less the benefits he will derive from his existence, if any. 
This “net burden” is then measured not against the value of a “normal” life,  
but against the nullity of nonexistence.287 
                                            
281 See Dawe, supra note 264, at 475. 
 
282 But see Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of Am., Inc., 700 A.2d 453, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that 
a surrogacy business had a special relationship with the parties and, therefore, owed a duty to protect the 
resulting child from foreseeable risks). 
 
283 But see supra note 264, at 477 (asserting that “With few exceptions modern courts have had little 
trouble accepting the elements of duty and breach in wrongful life cases.”)  However, the author cites only 
one case, Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d, 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981) in 
support of this contention. 
 
284 See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 497 
(Wash. 1983); Procanik ex rel. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 765 (N.J. 1984), rev'd, 543 A.2d 985 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988). 
 
285 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334(1) (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (LexisNexis 1998); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2971(2) (West Supp. 2007), following Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209, 
212-13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), abrogated by Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. 1999); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 145.424(1) (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.130(1) (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
03-43 (1996); 42 PA. CONN. STAT. ANN. § 8305(b) (West 2007), following Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 
1327, 1329-30 (Pa. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (2002);  
 
286 See Ronen Perry, It’s a Wonderful Life, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 329, 336-37 (2008) (listing more than 20 
states where courts rejected such claims). See also Doolan v. IVF Am. (MA), Inc., 2000 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 581, at 8-12 (rejecting a tort claim brought on behalf of a child born with cystic fibrosis against a 
fertility clinic for negligence in genetic screening of IVF embryos before implantation because it amounted 
to a claim for Wrongful Life not recognized in Massachusetts). 
 
287 See supra note 65, at 479-80.  
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The response has been that: 
 
Courts have consistently refused to recognize claims for wrongful life because  
of the deep-seated ethical dilemma involved.288 Few courts have been willing to 
say that children, no matter how severely impaired, would have better off had 
they never been born. “One of the most deeply held beliefs in our society is that 
life—whether experienced with or without major physical handicap—is more 
precious than non-life.”289 
 
     Courts have held “…that life itself cannot constitute injury.”290 As a result the harm 
element cannot be satisfied when there is a birth, even the birth of an impaired child. In 
the unlikely event that a wrongful life cause of action is recognized, a claimant will find 
it very difficult to establish any of the first three elements, and the fourth may be 
judicially impossible for the parent(s)291 or the child.292  
 
4. EMBRYO DISPOSAL – THE LIABILITY MYSTERY 
 
     We discussed specific causes of action that may make embryo donors or suppliers 
liable above, but we would be remiss if we did not also address potential liability for 
                                            
288 See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411-12 (1978) (“[W]hether it is better never to have been 
born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the 
philosophers and the theologian.”) 
 
289 See supra note 277, at 539 (citing Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979).  
 
290 See Deanna A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis and Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 327, 328 
(2004). 
 
291 See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 1967 N.J. LEXIS 203 at 11-12: 
 
A considerable problem is raised by the claim of injury to the parents. In order to  
determine their compensatory damages a court would have to evaluate the denial to 
 them of the intangible, unmeasurable, and complex human benefits of motherhood  
and fatherhood and weigh these against the alleged emotional and money injuries.  
Such a proposed weighing is similar to that which we have found impossible to  
perform for the infant plaintiff. When the parents say their child should not have been  
born, they make it impossible for a court to measure their damages in being the  
mother and father of a defective child.  Though we sympathize with the unfortunate  
situation in which these parents find themselves, we firmly believe the right of their  
child to live is greater than and precludes their right not to endure emotional and  
financial injury. Id. at 14. 
 
292 Id. at 10 (“The infant would have us measure the difference between his life with defects against the 
utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such determination.”) 
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embryo storage facilities intentionally destroying embryos.  The challenge is that we 
cannot identify one primary cause of action likely at issue because liability would depend 
on the legal status of embryos.  What we do believe is that there are more than 500,000 
embryos currently in cryopreservation.293  Those embryos belong294 to the prospective 
parents, at least until certain contractual events do or do not occur295 and many of those 
prospective parents eventually place the holding facility in a position where it has the 
legal right to dispose of the embryos.296 While many of these facilities would like to do 
so,297 they are very afraid of litigation.298 They might gain guidance from a very small 
                                            
293 See supra text accompanying note 60. 
 
294 But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (West 2006). 
 
295 See Fontini Antonia Skouvakis, Defining the Undefined: Using a Best Interests Approach to Decide the 
Fate of Cryopreserved Preembryos in Pennsylvania, 109, Penn. St. L. Rev. 885, 902 (2005) (The author 
spoke to twenty infertility clinics posing as a potential customer. All stated they utilized “informed 
consent” forms identifying how pre-embryos would be disposed of.) But see Mundy, supra note 39, at 7 
(doctors, while commonly contractually empowered to dispose of embryos in events such as patient 
divorce, disappearance, or failure to make payment, do not dispose out of fear of unknown litigation).  
   Interestingly such agreements may restrict the recipients disposition options as well. See Id. See also the 
hypothetical scenario discussed at Jonathan Penn, A Different Kind of Life Estate: The Laws, Rights, and 
Liabilities Associated with Donated Embryos, 21 Regent U.L. Rev. 207, 208 (2008-2009) (it involves a 
contract specifying that “…nothwithstanding the foregoing, the Intended Parents…shall not donate, see, or 
otherwise transfer any donated ova, pre-embryos, or embryos that result from the Procedure to another 
person or couple (other than a gestational surrogate working with the Intended Parents) for the purpose of 
conception.”) 
 
296 See Mundy, supra note 39, at 7 (“The way it happens is this: When patients agree to have embryos 
frozen, they sign forms stating what should be done with the embryos should the patients divorce, 
disappear, or stop paying storage fees. After treatment has concluded, many patients eventually do stop 
paying, disappear, move [and] leave no forwarding address.”) Many embryo owners cannot be located, 
period.  Id. at 4.  
 
297 Id. at 7. “People do not want to inherit embryos.” 
 
And the risk of holding them is considerable. “I have tons of embryos, and I can’t track  
down the owners,” said one Los Angeles doctor, Vicken Sahakian of the Pacific Fertility 
Center…”It’s one of the main problems I have. I have thousands of embryos from patients  
who have been through this program for, what, 10-, 12-plus years, changing addresses,  
and never called back, never paid storage fees—you can’t track them down.” Id. at 8. 
 
His “biggest nightmare,” he said, is that he will be unable to sell his practice when he is  
ready to retire, because no doctor will want to buy a practice that comes with a closetful  
of unclaimed embryos and the vague, terrible responsibility they entail. “The person  
buying it does not want to buy the embryos. That’s the rule,” he said. “People do not  
want to inherit embryos. So what do you do with them? I have embryos that have been  
here since 1992.” Id. 
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pool of decisions holding that embryo disposition is usually dictated by contract.299 
However, not all courts hold such agreements enforceable and almost all of the existing 
cases arose out of disputes that addressed some aspect of potentially unwanted familial 
relationships.300 Only one case is possibly on point in terms of the independent 
disposition by a holding facility with no inter-related “custody” issues, New York-Del Zio 
v. Presbyterian Hospital.301 
     In New York-Del Zio, the Del Zios underwent in vitro fertilization using Mr. Del Zio’s 
sperm and Mrs. Del Zio’s egg.302 The co-mingled materials were placed in an 
incubator.303 A supervisor learned of the embryo, felt it was his ethical duty to destroy it, 
consulted hospital officials, and did destroy it.304  The Del Zios brought suit for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful conversion.305  The jury returned 
a verdict for the Del Zios on the intentional infliction claim, but for the hospital on the 
wrongful conversion cause of action.306  We glean two things from New York-Del Zio. 
First, a holding facility disposing of an embryo, without contractual right, can be liable to 
the prospective parents in tort.  Second, if the embryo is viewed as other than property, 
the facility is not liable under wrongful conversion, as conversion is predicated on 
wrongful possession of property.307  This is extremely interesting because, if embryos are 
                                                                                                                                  
298 See Mundy, supra n. 39, at 8 (“’Nobody does it [destroys abandoned embryos],’ says Alan DeCherney, 
the editor of Ferility and Sterility and a reproductive endocrinologist who is now at the National Institute of 
Health. ‘It’s a hot topic. People think the risk of holding them is less than the risk of destroying them.’”) 
 
299 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 355 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 216 
(Wash. 2002); York v. Jones, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7750.  
 
300 See, e.g., A.Z v. B.Z, 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B, 751 A.2d 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2000); In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2004). 
 
301 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11450. 
 
302 Id. at 3. 
 
303 Id.  
 
304 Id. 
 
305 Id. at 1. 
 
306 Id. at 11. 
 
307 See Penn, supra n. 295, at 213:  
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not property, some disposal would open the door for wrongful death308 claims, but one 
court found that it unlikely a defendant could be held responsible for the wrongful death 
of a human embryo because the claim would be too speculative,309 while another found 
that the state Wrongful Death Act was not applicable to situations where the embryo was 
destroyed pre-implantation.310 On the other hand, if embryos are property, it seems only 
logical that facilities disposing of them, in violation of an existing contract, could face 
liability from conversion311 claims, and possibly other causes of action such as trespass to 
chattels312. 
B. THE SURROGACY TRADE313 
                                                                                                                                  
Presumably, the jury in the Del Zio case found for the Del Zios on the emotional  
Distress claim because they viewed the embryo as the only opportunity for the Del  
Zios to become pregnant and hopefully give birth to a child. Viewing the embryo  
as the potential for human life is also consistent with the jury's finding for the  
defendants on the wrongful conversion claim, a claim where it must be proven that  
“one who, without authority, intentionally exercised control over the property of  
another and thereby interfered with the other's right of possession . . . .”  
Presumably, the jury considered the embryo to be human life or the potential for  
human life, rather than property. Therefore, the jury denied the Del Zios' property  
claim of wrongful conversion.  
 
308 For purposes of this article “wrongful death” is defined as “The taking of the life of an individual 
resulting from the willful or negligent act of another person or persons.) See West’s ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICAN LAW, available at http://www.answers.com/topic/wrongful-death-claim (last visited Jan. 6, 
2011). 
 
309 See Jeter, supra note 250, 1256. 
 
310 See Miller v. American Infertility Group, 897 N.E.2d 837 (2008). The case, in dicta, left open the issue 
of applicability post-implantation.  
 
311 While the specific elements of torts vary by jurisdiction, a common definition of “conversion” is “The 
unlawful turning or applying the personal goods of another to the use of the taker, or of some other person 
than the owner; or the unlawful destroying or altering their nature.” See 
http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c309.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
 
312 See Luize E. Zubrow, Rethinking Article 9 Remedies: Economic and Fiduciary Perspectives, 42 UCLA 
L. Rev. 445, n. 307 (1994) (“The early common law distinguished between trespass to chattel, a lesser form 
of conversion involving negligent interference with the property of others, and conversion, an intentional 
exercise of dominion or control which seriously interferes with the right of another to control the property. 
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217 cmt. b, 222 cmt. a & 222(A) (1964). 
 
313 While discussion of the employment relationship between surrogates and surrogate providers is beyond 
the scope of this article, we do note that potential provider liability for surrogate actions or inaction could 
differ depending on whether surrogates are employed as employees or independent contractors. See, e.g., 
Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to the Realities of 
Cost Containment?, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 1219, 1237 (1997) (noting that the doctrine of respondeat superior 
depends on existence of employer-employee, or closely analogous, relationship and generally does not 
apply to acts of independent contractor). 
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“In the absence of statutory law positively governing our decision,  
we must innovate.”314 
 
1. NEGLIGENCE 
 
The well-established elements of negligence are duty, breach, proximate 
causation, and damage or injury.315 As we discuss next, in a surrogacy arrangement the 
surrogate providers, and the surrogate herself, may face negligence liability. The 
surrogate provider may be liable for failing to screen materials used or the prospective 
parties. The surrogate may be liable for care taken of the embryo while in her possession, 
as the relationship between her and the prospective parent(s) may be a bailment. 
 
a. SCREENING 
 
Tissues potentially involved in surrogacy include sperm, eggs, and embryos. 
While there are no cases on point regarding eggs and embryos, there is a sperm case that 
may provide insight regarding potential surrogate provider liability.316  Stiver v. Parker317 
addressed the situation where the surrogate (Stiver) was artificially inseminated with the 
untested sperm of the prospective father (Malahoff). The resulting child suffered from 
cytomegalic inclusion disease (“CID”), transmitted through his father’s sperm. The 
child’s CID symptoms included hearing loss, mental retardation, and severe neuro-
muscular disorders.318 The surrogate, and her husband, brought suit under a negligence 
claim against the clinic.319 The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the 
                                                                                                                                  
 
314 Stiver v. Parker, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21830, at 17. 
 
315 See Grubbs, supra note 253. 
 
316 The analogy is appropriate as sperm and embryos are both reproductive tissues.  See supra note 114. 
 
317 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21830.  
 
318 Id. at 2. Interestingly, it was later learned that the surrogate was already pregnant when inseminated. The 
father of the resulting child was, in fact, her husband and not the clinic’s client. Id. 
 
319 Id. at 7. 
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broker in a surrogacy arrangement had no legal duty.320 The court of appeals reversed321 
holding: 
We conclude that…the surrogacy business designer and broker and  
other defendant professionals who profited from the program, owed  
affirmative duties to the Stivers and to Malahoff, the surrogacy program 
beneficiaries. This duty, an affirmative duty of protection, marked by  
heightened diligence, arises out of a special relationship because the  
defendants engaged in the surrogacy business and expected to profit  
thereby.322  Our view is that surrogate arrangements for the transfer of  
babies present significant dangers for society and therefore require careful 
regulation and control through the development of the common law of 
negligence…[t]his strong state interest justifies regulation…in new areas  
of “baby transfer” made possible by technology.323 
 
     While Stiver was not mandatory authority, a later case adopted its “special 
relationship” basis for establishing a legal duty in surrogacy arrangements. In Huddleston 
v. Infertility Center of America324 the child of a traditional surrogate died after suffering 
serious abuse by his father.325 The surrogate (Huddleston) brought a variety of claims, 
including negligence, against the infertility clinic contracting her services.326 The court 
first distilled the issue; “Is there a duty owed by a surrogacy clinic to the participants of a 
program which is specifically designed to create a child outside the boundaries of the 
traditional nuclear family setting?”327 It then concluded, much like Stiver, that: 
[A] business operating for the sole purpose of organizing and supervising  
the very delicate process of creating a child, which reaps handsome profits  
from such endeavor, must be held accountable for the foreseeable risks of  
the surrogacy undertaking because a “special relationship” exists between  
                                            
320 Id. at 1. 
 
321 Id. at 7 (“We conclude under Michigan law of negligence that the defendants owed an affirmative duty 
to act to protect the plaintiffs against harm, a duty that may have been breached.”) 
 
322 Id. at 20. 
 
323 Id. at 22-23. 
 
324 1997 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2650. 
 
325 Id. at 4. 
 
326 Id. at 1. 
 
327 Id. at 9. 
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the surrogacy business, its client-participants, and, most especially, the  
child which the surrogacy undertaking creates. Such a special relationship  
existed between ICA, Appellant and Jonathan in this case and thus, ICA  
owed them an affirmative duty of protection.328 
 
     That “protection” meant that the surrogate provider had the duty to screen prospective 
parents.  It is also clear from the court’s discussion that providers had the duty to screen 
prospective surrogates as well.329 The above cases identify duties that could be breached 
and provide facts that could allow proximate causation determination. However the 
damage element may again be difficult to meet in jurisdictions requiring physical 
injury.330 If embryos are “people”, there could be requisite physical injury.331 If, on the 
other hand, embryos are property, liability assessment may be assessed under the 
traditional concept of “bailment.”  
 
  2. BAILMENT 
 
     A bailment is “the temporary placement of control over, or possession of personal 
property by one person, the bailor, into the hands of another, the bailee, for a designated 
purpose upon which the parties have agreed.”332 There are three types of bailments: (1) 
for mutual benefit to the bailor and bailee; (2) for the sole benefit of the bailor; and (3) 
for the sole benefit of the bailee.333 When embryos are property, surrogacy is legally a 
mutual bailment. In a mutual bailment the bailee must take reasonable care of the bailed 
property.334 A bailee who fails to do so may be held liable for any damages incurred from 
                                            
328 Id. at 17. 
 
329 While the court did not reach a conclusion on that issue, it noted that other jurisdictions required parties 
to prospective surrogacy agreements to undergo psychological testing. Id. at 19. See also Mercer, supra 
note 22 at 80 (“Since there may be potential liability to clinics and agencies involved with embryo 
transfer…it would be in the clinic or agency’s best interest to perform background checks on recipient 
couples in order to reduce potential liability.”) 
 
330 See supra text accompanying note 260. 
 
331 Some jurisdictions also recognize prenatal torts without specifically finding that an unborn child is a 
“person in being”. See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364 (1960). 
 
332 See http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/bailment (last visited Jan. 9, 2011).  
 
333 Id. 
 
334 Id. 
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his or her negligence.335 While the contention that surrogacy is a bailment will be 
unconscionable to those against commodification of human reproductive tissue,336 at 
least one court has applied bailment law when deciding ownership rights of an embryo.337 
That court was correct. Bailment provides the proper liability analysis where embryos do 
not have some sort of heightened legal status because, in those jurisdictions, embryos are 
property. 
 
3. BREACH OF CONTRACT 
 
     This potential cause of action may correlate with aspects of negligence assessment. 
The first element of negligence is duty. The existence of that element is well established, 
but its definition is always subjective as it is predicated upon the “reasonable person” 
standard.338 Clarification of a surrogate’s duties may come from a surrogacy contract.339 
Breach of any such duty would then not only satisfy the first two elements of negligence, 
but also trigger breach of contract. Surrogates should face liability when failing to do 
what that agreement requires,340 while surrogate providers should face liability when 
                                                                                                                                  
 
335 Id. 
 
336 See supra note 211. One author believes this discussion is much less heated than in the past. See 
Elizabeth Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 J.L. & Con’t Problems 108, 121 (2009) 
(“Today the issue is seldom framed as baby selling and exploitation; instead the discourse emphasizes the 
service provided by surrogates to couples who otherwise could not have genetically related children.”) 
However, it is difficult to imagine a dearth of heated opinions should a surrogate seek to exercise a “lien” 
over a resulting child in order to enforce payment and it appears some surrogacy agreements anticipate just 
such situation. See http://indiansurrogacylaw.com/surrogacy-agreement.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2011). 
While seeking to enforce such a lien would, undoubtedly, create an emotional fervor, the legal issue is 
clearly addressed under the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. 
XIII, § 1. (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States….”). No such 
lien would be enforceable. 
 
337 See York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 
338 See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 36 
Ariz. St. L.J. 805, 810 (2004) (“Duty in negligence actions is substantially defined by foreseeability of risk 
as measured by the reasonably prudent person.”) 
 
339 “Although affirmative duties in negligence law are imposed ‘by operation of law’, a contract frequently 
operates in the background and the specific obligations ‘may and frequently do arise out of a contractual 
relationship.’” See Stiver, supra note 314, at 12, citing Clark v. Dalman, 379 Mich. 251 (1967).  
 
340 Agreements may require the to-be surrogate promise to refrain from activities such as smoking tobacco, 
drinking alcohol, or taking other drugs. See Golmar Modjtahedi, Nobody’s Child: Enforcing Surrogacy 
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failing to meet contractual duties to surrogates or prospective parents.341 This cause of 
action is viable, but determination of controlling law may be difficult342 and breach of 
contract may be impossible in jurisdiction invalidating any form of surrogacy agreement. 
 
VII. LOOKING AHEAD 
 
 
     The increasingly symbiotic relationship between ART and the Internet fundamentally 
changes how human procreation can be facilitated. Much is uncertain in the 
Cyberprocreation Era, but issues regarding embryo donation and/or surrogacy will be 
significant on many levels, and likely manifest quickly. Accordingly we offer the 
following predictions and recommendations: 
 
1. Prediction – a group, or groups, will call for an absolute ban on embryo donation 
and/or commercial surrogacy worldwide.  
Recommendation – it is unlikely that such restriction would be adopted globally 
due to political volatility343 and economic necessity.344 Such a ban would really 
create fewer good and service providers, likely with even less regulation.345 We 
do not recommend this ban. 
                                                                                                                                  
Contracts, 20 Whittier L. Rev. 243, 249 (1998).  See also http://www.information-on-surrogacy.com/best-
surrogacy.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).  
 
341 See supra text accompanying note 218. 
 
342 See Baiman, supra note 112, at 135 (“[I]s the applicable state law the law of the home state of the 
genetic parents, the law of the state in which the embryos were created, or the law of the state where the 
recipient party lives?”) One could go further and add the law of the state where the embryos are currently 
located and the law of the state where the contract was created to this list. 
 
343 See supra n. 87, at 704-705 (discussing Italy’s extreme shift from one of the least ART regulated 
countries to one that now prohibits egg donorship for ART.) “This problem will only be inflamed as 
countries continue to change their laws, which are becoming increasingly divergent from one another.” Id. 
at 707. 
 
344 Market demands may sway countries to defy international agreements in pursuit of RT dollars. See Id. at 
707-08. Additionally, clinics are sourcing reproductive materials from poorer countries. See Buying Babies, 
Bit By Bit; Assisted Conception, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 2006, available at 
http://www.uslaw.com/bulletin/buying-babies-bit-by-bit.php?p=118) (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).  
 
345 “As medical tourism becomes more lucrative, countries may compete by offering treatments that other 
countries do not offer. Poor countries may be tempted to offer treatments that are illegal or highly 
experimental elsewhere.” See Cortez, supra note 72, at 104. 
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2. Prediction – there will be a call for the United States to ban embryo donation346 
and/or commercial surrogacy.  
 
Recommendation – we cannot endorse this proposal, as it would likely result in 
fewer providers with less regulation. We do recommend that Congress use its 
interstate commerce power to regulate collection, storage, and screening of human 
embryos.347 While some authors favor “double decker” ART regulation, meaning 
directives at both the federal and state levels,348 we recommend any other embryo, 
and all surrogacy regulation, only at the state level,349 We do so for two reasons. 
First, state courts decide family law issues.350 Second, as detailed in the case 
law351 and demonstrated statutorily,352 the states may have very different public 
                                                                                                                                  
 
346 See, e.g., Ann Bindu Thomas, Avoiding EMBRYOS “R” US: Toward a Regulated Fertility Industry, 27 
Wash. U. L.J. & Pol’y 247271 (2008) (the author advocates for three components of such regulation “(1) 
embryos should not be bought or sold in a monetary exchange, (2) donors’ decisions should be fully 
informed and truly voluntary, and (3) embryo procurement organizations should be non-profit and conform 
to standards similar to [the National Organ Transplant Act].”) 
 
347 But see Debra Spar, Reproductive Tourism and the Regulatory Map, 352 New Eng. J. Med. 531, 532 
(2005) (“Americans, with their distrust of bureaucratic authority, would never condone the extension of 
federal power into the intimate affairs of reproduction.”); Alicia Ouellette et al., Lessons From Across the 
Pond: Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United Kingdom and the United States, 31 Am. J. L. and 
Med. 419, 433 (2005) (arguing that federal regulation of ART is problematic). These perspectives may or 
may not be prescient, but the sale of some body parts is already federally regulated. See 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) 
(“It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ 
for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”)  
 
348 See Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law 
Protect then from Harm?, 207 PLI/CRIM 325, 328 (2004); Wise, supra n. 29, at 188.  
 
349 This would also be in accord with the most current version of the UPA. See supra note 102 at Comment 
following §802, “[T]he core sections of this article provide for state involvement, through judicial 
oversight, of the gestational agreement before, during, and after the assisted reproductive processes.”  
 
350 See Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the Law: Disharmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100 
N.W. U.L. REV. 465, 466 (2006) (“[D]omestic relations law is generally reserved for the states.”) However, 
the author goes on to recognize, with regard to ART issues, “…a fractured, state-by-state approach to the 
subject has arisen.” Id.  Another author would likely contend those differences are acceptable, and the key 
is that parties considering surrogacy arrangements have clear statutory directive so that they can make 
informed decisionn. See supra note 114, at 135 (“Without a clear statutory scope, parties and courts will 
remain in the dark as to which state law applies in a dispute.”). 
 
351 See, e.g., note 186 
 
352 See supra text accompanying notes 132-154. 
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policies regarding embryos and surrogacy.353 We understand this 
recommendation will create a lack of uniformity,354 and that some will attempt to 
exploit lax or nonexistent state laws,355 but it appropriately respects the divergent 
interests of the individual states.  
 
3. Prediction – there will be an increasing market for designer embryos, likely a 
significant one, despite inevitable controversy. This market will be fueled by 
customers seeking a cheaper and more effective alternative to IVF and fed by 
suppliers providing embryos created outside the human body.356 Individual 
suppliers will attempt to stand out in that market by implying, but not outright 
promising, that resulting children will have, or not have, certain characteristics. 
 
Recommendation – we cannot speak to the non-domestic markets as there is too 
much uncertain or unknown in terms of policy or priority, but United States 
embryo suppliers, supplying to American clients, should pay close attention to 
what has happened and what that portends for the future. The technological 
advances that may make market participation attractive will also present 
                                                                                                                                  
 
353 It seems a safe assumption that this is one of the reasons so few states adopted UPA 2002 and none 
without changes. See supra note 100. There was another uniform law proposed as well, see Uniform Status 
of Children of Assisted Conception Act, available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/uscaca88.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). We find no 
record of any state adopting this Act. 
 
354 See Hugh McLachlan and J. Kim Swales, Commercial Surrogate Motherhood and the Alleged 
Commodification of Children: A Defense of Legally Enforceable Contracts, available at 
http://law.duke.edu/journals/lcp (last visited Jan. 3, 2010) (“In federations like the United States or the 
European Union, the unevenness of legal restriction or regulation by individual states or countries 
compounds the problem.”) But see Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr 2d. 280, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
(“…even though [that] might not be perfect on a case-by-case basis, [it] would bring some predictability to 
those who seek to make use of artificial reproductive techniques.  
 
355 In fact, that is precisely what attorney Noel Keane did. Frustrated that his home state of Michigan 
treated compensation to surrogates as illegal, he sent couples to Kentucky where there was no such 
restriction. See supra n. 147, at 98. Keane would become known as the “father of surrogate motherhood”. 
Id. 
 
356 It is unlikely that prospective parents will be able to find true embryo donors. At least one study 
demonstrates that parents of preserved embryos cannot make a donation or “disposition decision”. See 
Mundy, supra note 39, at 5. “The average embryo had been in storage for four years. Even after that much 
time had elapsed, 72 % had not decided what to do, and a number echoed the words of one patient: ‘We 
can’t talk about it.’” Id. at 5. 
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increasing liability under causes of action for strict product liability and breach of 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. While these are “unheard of” now, 
they likely will become quite strident in the not too distant future. 
 
4. Prediction – states will struggle with the legal status of embryos and this will 
impact disposal of stored embryos and potential surrogate liability. 
 
Recommendation – states not concluding that embryos have some “additional” 
rights, or otherwise regulating surrogacy arrangements, should apply bailment 
analysis as embryos are property. States statutorily defining embryos as “people” 
must address disposal and surrogate liability under wrongful death causes of 
action. States that have elevated embryo status, either at common law or by 
statute, should follow a case-by-case analysis similar to Davis v. Davis,357 with 
the understanding that a) Davis was decided on different grounds;358 b) at a point 
in time before dramatic ART use growth commenced;359 and c) these are 
potentially highly volatile issues.360 States that have fetal homicide statutes, or 
otherwise at least tacitly treat embryos as more than property, should adopt case-
by-case analysis as well. 
 
5. Prediction – prospective parties will continue to develop and rely on surrogacy 
contracts. 
                                            
357 842 S.W.2d 604  
 
358 Id. “Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreartion should prevail, assuming that the other party has 
a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than the use of the [embryos] in question.” 
 
359 So, potentially, there could be a lot of case-by-case analysis going forward. This may prove unwieldy to 
courts seeking efficiency and clear precedent. 
 
360 See supra note 213. On a related note, these are exactly the type of legal issues, ones with potentially 
polarizing moral underpinnings, that could be potentially problematic for Judges, particularly elected 
Judges engaging in case-by-case analysis, in light of recent events. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Iowa Vote 
Shows the Injustice of Electing Judges, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2030526,00.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). (All three 
Iowa Supreme Court Justices failed to withstand retention vote after the Court unanimously upheld a pr-gay 
marriage ruling in the prior term. It was the first time any Justice had been removed since 1962.) This type 
of movement may just be getting started. See Removal of Iowa Judges May Inspire Similar Efforts, 
available at http://thegazette.com/2010/11/05/removal-of-iowa-judges-may-inspire-similar-efforts/ (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2011). 
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Recommendation – would-be parties must be aware of the laws and public 
policies of the jurisdictions that may interpret their agreements.361 If not, they 
may be unpleasantly surprised to learn that a) the contract is not enforceable; b) 
the surrogate may have parental rights; c) the surrogate may have parental 
responsibilities; and even d) parties may face criminal charges for pursuing 
services abroad that are illegal domestically.362 This multitude of uncertainties 
epitomizes the plight of embryo donors and suppliers, surrogates and surrogate 
providers, and prospective parents in the Cyberprocreation era. Ongoing 
discussion and analysis is vital because, in terms of human reproduction, the 
Internet generates more questions than answers. 
 
                                            
361 See, e.g., P.G.M. v. J.M.A., 2007 Min. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1189. A New York male contracted with a 
Minnesota female for surrogacy services. The couple executed a written gestational surrogacy agreement 
“(GSA”) that specified the agreement was governed by Illinois law. The IVF and implantation procedures 
took place at an Illinois clinic. The Minnesota court applied Illinois law. While this holding is straight-
forward, this case should not be read too broadly. The court reasoned that “Minnesota courts ‘ traditionally 
enforce parties’ contractual law provisions.’” Id. at 7 of 12. However, the court also noted that “Minnesota 
courts will not enforce an otherwise validly executed contract that contravenes public policy (citation 
omitted). Contracts violate public policy when they injure some established societal interest (citation 
omitted).” Id. at 9 of 12. The decision came down to the fact that there was no established public policy in 
Minnesota prohibiting GSAs or the enforcement of GSAs. It can certainly be read to mean that the contract 
would not have been enforced, despite the selection of Illinois law, if the result would have violated 
Minnesota public policy. This is important to note as there are certainly states where a GSA would violate 
such policy. Similar uncertainty may even exist within a state; Massachusetts’ courts have both upheld 
choice of law provisions (see Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004) and refused to uphold them 
(see R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) in surrogacy agreements. 
 
362 See Gilles Cuniberti, Flying to California to Bypass the French Ban on Surrogacy, available at 
http://conflictoflaws.net/2007/flying-to-california-to-bypass-the-french-ban-on-surrogacy/ (last visited Jan. 
17, 2011) (discussing a French couple who flew to California to use the services of an American 
commercial surrogate as such services are illegal in France. They returned home, with twin girls, to find 
multiple criminal charges for their actions. The counts were dismissed, but only on pleading technicalities, 
and not for lack of merit.). 
 
